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NLRA SECTION 8(a)(3) AND THE SEARCH
FOR A NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
Joan Baker*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The focus in this Article on section 8(a)(3) 1 of the National
Labor Relations Act [hereinafter "NLRA" or "the Act"] 2 is for the
primary purpose of revealing and examining some of the underlying
problems of national labor policy. The interpretation and application
of the National Labor Relations Act, since its enactment by the
Board and the courts, especially by the United States Supreme
Court, has led to the evolution of a confused national labor policy
that does not effectively serve any of the basic social, political or
economic values which are sometimes claimed for it.3 The problems
encountered in a variety of cases decided under section 8(a)(3) and
their resolution by the Board and the courts, especially by the Supreme Court, illustrate a number of the important features of labor
policy and the underlying values they have served and disserved. 4
Section 8(a)(3) is, of course, not separable from the rest of the
provisions of the NLRA, nor from other labor legislation. However,
it is significant because it is the most frequently litigated section of
the Act, 5 and policy decisions under it probably have been among
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University; JD George Washington University;
LLM Yale Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Debora
S. Lasch, Esq. and Jack Remaley.

1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1982).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 8-13.
2.

4. See Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968) (provid-

ing a thorough examination of the Supreme Court's major 8(a)(3) decisions up to 1968, and
the evolution of the Court's treatment of motive and/or intent as elements of 8(a)(3) viola-

tions); see also R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW at 326-66 (1976); Cox, A Reexamination of the Role of Employer Motive Under Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 161 (1982).
5. Section 8(a)(1) is included in all unfair labor practice charges filed against employers, and might be considered to be the most frequently litigated for that reason. However, it
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the most controversial and the most difficult to harmonize of all the
NLRA provisions. The section 8(a)(3) cases provide an opportunity
to explore labor policy as it actually exists in the United States, as
well as an opportunity to suggest how different policies, embodied in
new legislation, might better achieve the social, political and economic needs of people in the United States. 6
The legislative proposals that conclude this Article suggest that
sweeping changes be made to existing labor legislation by requiring
fundamental clarification or redefinition of national labor policy.'
This Article suggests changes to existing rights and duties of its institutional and individual participants that would better serve shared
social, political and economic values. The proposals undoubtedly are
controversial. Such controversy may assist in finally moving Congress toward closely examining all the issues connected with existing
labor policy in a comprehensive fashion.
Fiddling with the existing problems under the labor statutes will
not cure them nor will it correct the course the Supreme Court has
taken in interpreting and applying those statutes. The problems are
fundamental and divisive. They are of central concern to all who
work and to the businesses that employ them. Their importance extends far beyond labor-management relations or what happens in the
workplace. If Congress cannot find the time to examine and redefine
national labor policy, then it can and should appoint a national commission, consisting of experts in the field as well as representatives of
the constituencies most affected by labor policies. The commission
would report to Congress periodically in a timely fashion with conclusions and legislative proposals developed through a well defined
and methodical study. Such important issues must no longer be left
to the sole and unguided judgment of the courts. Nor should they be
buried because they are controversial. It is time for the controversies
to be aired and resolved.
was alleged as the central or sole violation in only 15.4 percent of charges filed in 1984,

whereas section 8(a)(3) was implicated in 53.1 percent of employer unfair labor practice
charges filed that year. See 49 NLRB
6.

ANN. REP.

175, table 2 (1988).

See infra text accompanying notes 122-29.

7. The Article will focus primarily on section 8(a)(3) analysis in an attempt to reveal
existing de facto national labor policy under the National Labor Relations Act as amended.
See infra text accompanying notes 82-121. What little exists of de jure national legislative

policy is contained in the preamble to the NLRA as amended. See National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
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SOME VALUES IMPLICATED IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY

A.

Social Values

Work is central to the physical survival of most people in any
society, and has a great deal of influence on the nature of any given
society. Engaging in work is one of the principal ways in which a
person becomes a participant in the life of a society. Work helps
both to define people as members of society and to give them the
means to live within it.8 Access to a job that will provide a decent
standard of living (adequate food and shelter and other benefits
which are essential for well-being, such as health care, education,
safe and pleasant communities with adequate public support services, and the means to have and support families) is socially essential for everyone who can learn to perform a job.'
8. See E.H. PHELPS BROWN, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR 9 (1962) (suggesting that work
does not necessarily provide people with social status that is satisfactory to them, nor does it
necessarily provide them with adequate means to live in their societies).
9. This is a frankly moral statement and does not reflect the real world in which we all
live today. The statement has a basis not only in moral philosphy, however, but also in certain
international statements of policy. See, e.g., The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976) [hereinafter International Covenant]. The United States is not a party to this multilateral treaty, allegedly, "because of concerns related to the constitutional distribution of federal-state powers." R. BLEDSOE & B.
BOCZEK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DICTIONARY 74 (1987).
The International Covenant is intended to effectuate, in part, policies adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See International Covenant. The preamble to the International Covenant states that the rights enumerated in it "derive from the inherent dignity of
the human person" and also that "in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights." International Covenant, at 5.
Article 11 of the International Covenant states that the parties to it shall "recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions." Id.
at 7.
The United States did vote to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
UNITED NATIONS, 1948 Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 467-68 (1973). Relevant provisions of this Declaration state:
Art. 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and
is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and
in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic,
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of
his personality.
Art. 23. 1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal
work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supple-
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In the United States there are many who lack meaningful
work10 and, therefore, cannot participate fully in society.1 Some of
mented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection
of his interests.
Art. 25. 1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event
of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All
children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Id.
10. The number of reported unemployed persons in the United States at the end of the
first half of 1989 was 6.5 million. Haugen, Employment Gains Slow in the First Halfof 1989,
112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (1989). However, not all of the people reported as unemployed
remain unemployed for long periods of time. In 1989, between 600,000 and 700,000 were out
of work for 27 weeks or longer, whereas over 5,000,000 were unemployed for 14 weeks or less.
See Current Labor Statistics: Employment Data, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 72, table 10
(1989). These official statistics may not include some people who have not actively sought jobs
or who have been unemployed for very long periods of time.
11. The inability of those who lack money, because of lack of work, to participate fully
in social and cultural activities that cost money is self-evident. There are other aspects of living
in a society which the unemployed poor do not enjoy that may not be so obvious, and which
bear mentioning. See HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN. YOUTH AND FAMILY, U.S.
CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND RECENT TRENDS, 1989, H.R.
Doc. No. 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE].
Throughout the 1980's, the most profound influence on American families has been
the mounting economic pressures which have diminished their resources and made
more children more vulnerable. The combined effects of persistently high rates of
poverty, declining earnings, underemployment and single parenting have made
childhood far more precarious and less safe for millions of America's children. Because these conditions are significantly worse for Black and Hispanic families, their
children grow up in disproportionately greater jeopardy.
Id.
According to the Committee, children constitute the single largest poverty group. See id.
at 5. One in five children, and one in four preschool children, live in poverty. See id. "Black
and Hispsanic children are two-to-three times more likely to be living in poverty than are
white children." Id. Between 1970 and 1987, the median income of children in single parent
families declined by 19 percent; in low income families with children, the average income
declined by 14 percent. See id. This compared with an increase for the highest income families
of 19 percent. See id. In 1988, 20 percent of all children had no public or private health
insurance. Id. at XI. The Committee concluded its introductory statement by stating:
Statistics may appear cold and impersonal, but they depict a reality which calls for
action. The numbers presented in this report and its predecessors tell us that not
just for one or two years, but day after day in this decade, children continue to be
assaulted by volatile economic and social forces. The persistent problems of poverty
and poor health are compounded by alarming rises in homelessness, youth violence
and the emergence of drug addiction and AIDS among babies.
Id. In a brief Summary of the Report, prepared for distribution prior to publication, the Committee stated that "there have been continued disparities along racial and income related lines
in child health indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, low birth-weight, homicide,
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those people lack the education or skills essential to perform the
work that is available. 2 Others simply cannot find work or have
given up looking for it.'" Perhaps a certain amount of this social failure may be inevitable at any given time in a modern industrial state,
but the fear is that we now may have in the United States a growing

permanent

underclass

unemployable.

of

the

unemployed

and

chronically

4

Even large numbers of those who work do not earn enough to
provide adequately for their families.' 5 Growing numbers of single
and overall health status." Id. at 8.
The Chairman of the Committee, Rep. George Miller (D.-Calif.) stated in connection
with the Report that "[w]e're launching millions of children on courses of failure" because of
the increase in the numbers of children living below the poverty level. The Plain Dealer
(Cleveland), Oct. 2, 1989, at A-2, col. 1.
The latest Census Bureau reports indicate that there are currently 31.9 million people
living below the poverty level in the United States, or 13.1 percent of the population. See The
Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 19, 1989, at A-2, col. 3. Commenting on these figures, Robert
Greenstein of the private Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, claimed that the poorest fifth
of the population received 4.6 percent of total national family income in 1988, while the richest fifth received 44 percent, the highest level ever recorded. Id.
In a further comment on the same Census statistics, it was reported that the President's
Office of Management and Budget may decide to create a new definition of "poor" that would
make the statistics look better by lifting 3.6 million Americans to just above the poverty line.
See The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 29, 1989, at 1, col. I. This would be accomplished by
dropping the poverty threshold for a family of four from $11,600 to $10,997. Id. If this were
done, many families "could lose eligibility for Medicaid, food stamps, free and reduced school
lunches and breakfasts, the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and
Children (WIC), Head Start and others," according to Brazaitis. Id.The income of the average poor family fell $4,851 below the poverty line last year. Id. Brazaitis stated that, "U.S.
bookkeepers may shove poor out of sight." Id.
12. For examples of private and governmental concern for this growing problem see,
e.g., DOL Secretary ForecastsSkilled Worker Shortage, 132 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 60 (Sept.
11, 1989); Improving Quality and Skills in Workforce, 131 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 314 (July
3, 1989); Education Deficiencies Cited at Public Hearing, 131 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 78
(May 15, 1989); Reduced Productivity, 131 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 29 (May 1, 1989); Dole
Sworn in as Secretary of Labor, 130 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 141, 143 (Feb. 6, 1989).
13. See Current Labor Statistics: Employment Data, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 100,

table 46 (1989). The latest reported U.S. unemployment rate is 5.5 percent of the civilian
working-age population. Id. The reports may not show those who are no longer receiving unemployment compensation or who are no longer seeking work. Id. Some sense of the gap may
be indicated by the discrepancy in the latest participation rate in the labor force as a percentage of the civilian working-age population, 65.9 percent, as compared to employment as a
percent of the civilian working-age population, 62.3 percent. Id. Another possible indicator is
that of the 557,000 work-age persons who reported, as of March 1988, that they were unemployed for the previous year because they had not been able to find jobs, 414,000, or 74 percent, were living below the poverty level. See U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENsus, table 21 Feb. 1989 [hereinafter BUREAU OF CENSUS]
14. See Education Deficiencies Cited At Public Hearing, 131 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 78
(May 15, 1989).
15. See Poverty In The United States, 1987, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
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parents, mostly women, are below the poverty level, which means
that their children also live in poverty, destined to grow up in circumstances that are bound to rob them of their dignity and opportunity to become fully participating members of society.' 6
Although the causes of those conditions are uncertain, most people would agree that the existence of large amounts of poverty and

its attendant evils are not compatible with a good society, or even
morally tolerable within it. Providing public support for individuals
who cannot support themselves or their families through work is an
increasingly limited solution because of our nation's declining ability
to make these support payments.

The country was in an analogous situation during the 1930s,
when the Wagner Act was introduced.'1 When Senator Wagner
presented the first draft of the proposed legislation, he addressed the
problems of economic stagnation and unemployment and made it
clear that curing those problems was a prime motivating reason for
the legislation.'" The program he espoused, which remains in at least
vestigial form in the preamble of the National Labor Relations
Act,' 9 was to give workers greater economic power by giving them
CENSUS,

table 20 (1989).

16. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 3,636,000 families with women as
head of household were below the poverty level; 3,296,000 of these families had children under
18 years of age, while 1,814,000 had children under 6 years of age. Id.
17. The original bill, S. 2926, was introduced by Senator Wagner on March 1, 1934. 1

NLRB,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

AcT 1935, at 15 (1985).

In introducing the bill, Senator Wagner indicated that his intention was to "clarify and fortify" certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, 73rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. 3443 (1934). Id. Moreover, it was based upon his experience as chairman of the
National Labor Board established by that earlier Act. Id. at 15-18. The legislation was therefore an extension of the existing federal government effort to correct the causes of recurrent
economic depressions, including the "great" depression still affecting the nation in 1934. Id. at
18-20.
18. See id. at 1400. Senator Wagner's comments on the legislation made in committee
hearings and on the floor of the Senate, as well as the published comments he made elsewhere
that were later inserted into hearing records or the Congressional Record are all recorded. Id.
The examples of his concern for the national economy are too numerous to cite in full. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 1958, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 44 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

AcT 1935, at 1410 (1985) (discussing the

economic background of the bill).
19. The relevant language is currently in section 1 of the Act as amended:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens
and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
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the political power as well as the means to collectively bargain with
their employers over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of

employment.2 0 His concern, and the concern of those who shared his
views, was not simply with organizational rights, but with the employees' effective use of those rights to increase their wages, and

thereby to increase their purchasing power. The idea, which sounds
economically unsophisticated today, is that if American workers had

the money to buy more goods, an increased demand would lead to an
increase in production and employment. 21 Everyone, in his view,

would benefit from the economic revitalization that would result. 2
Experience has proven that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The language in section 2 of the bill (S. 2926) introduced by Senator
Wagner was somewhat stronger. See I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 15 (1985).
20. See 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs AcT
1935, at 15 (1985). When Senator Wagner introduced the original version of the bill, S. 2926,
he stated that:
The keynote of the recovery program is organization and cooperation. Employers
are allowed to unite in trade associations in order to pool their information and
experience and make a concerted drive upon the problems of modern industrialism.
If properly directed, this united strength will result in unalloyed good to the Nation.
But it is fraught with great danger to workers and consumers if it is not counterbalanced by the equal organization and equal bargaining power of employees. Such
equality is the central need of the economic world today. It is necessary to insure a
wise distribution of wealth between management and labor, to maintain a full flow
of purchasing power, and to prevent recurrent depressions.
S. REP. No. 2926, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 15 (1985).
21. Senator Wagner, in introducing his original bill, stated that the recovery program
"has achieved remarkable results in increasing employment, swelling the volume of industrial
activity, and promoting confidence." Id. at 17. He added:
It has made relatively slow progress in affecting that fair distribution of purchasing
power upon which permanent prosperity must rest. Today, despite the minimumwage provisions of the codes, the purchasing power of the individual employee working full time is less than it was during March of last year. This situation cannot be
remedied by new codes or by general exhortations. It can be remedied only when
there is genuine cooperation between employers and employees, on a basis of equal
bargaining power. The only road to this goal is the free and unhampered development of real employee organizations and their complete recognition. Such development was promised by the Recovery Act. It should be guaranteed by enactment of
the new legislation which is being proposed today.
22.

Id.
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By the time Taft-Hartley Act 2 3 amendments were enacted, na-

tional concern was focused more intently on economically destructive
strikes and the increasingly unacceptable practices of some unions,
including, but not limited to, the closed shop.24 There is no indication that Congress considered the potential social value of national
labor policy. Attention was limited to the labor situation as it then
existed, but the broader questions concerning the need for meaningful work opportunities for all the people and the need for adequate
levels of remuneration for that work, were not addressed in the
legislation.
The question of adequate pay scales for the average working
person to maintain a socially acceptable standard of living does not
just affect the working and non-working poor. As the cost of living
has increased in the United States over the last several decades, the
ability of many wage earners to support families has been severely
eroded.2 5 Now many working people cannot afford to buy houses in
the communities in which they live and work.26 This means that it
has become financially necessary for increasing numbers of women
of child-bearing and child-rearing age to work.27 In many respects
this change has served the interest of greater equality for women as
23. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 101-503, 49 Stat. 449 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1982)).
24. The "closed shop" under the original National Labor Relations Act was the practice
whereby a union representing a majority of employees in the bargaining unit could lawfully
agree with the employer that the employer would hire only union members to fill jobs in the

bargaining unit. See R. GORMAN,

BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 640 (1976); see also 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 3275 (1985).
25. See Current Labor Statistics: Employment Data, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 86, table

30 (1989). In terms of 1967 dollars, the Consumer Price Index for all items increased from
100 to 371.7 by June 1989. Id. The purchasing power of the June 1989 dollar was only 26.9
cents in 1967 dollars, and 80.6 cents in 1982 dollars. Id.
26. Homeowners' costs increased 36.5 percent between December 1982 and June 1989.
See id. However, the Hourly Earnings Index for all production or nonsupervisory workers in
terms of 1977 dollars showed a slight decline between 1982 and 1989. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS.,

table 1, Current Wage Developments, Feb. 1989. The Select Com-

mittee on Children, Youth and Families, in summarizing its as yet unpublished report, states
that the proportion of children living in family-owned housing has dropped from 71 percent in
1981 to 64 percent in 1988, while the proportion in rental housing increased from 29 percent
to 36 percent. See SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 11. In 1988 3.7 million children, 6 percent
of all children, lived in public housing. Id. The Committee estimates that between 35,000 to
100,000 children are homeless on any given night. Id.
27. According to the Select Committee, the number of children under 18 with working
mothers increased from 53 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1988. See SELECT COMMITTEE,
supra note 11. The Committee states: "Women with infants make up the fastest growing
group in the labor force." Id. The Commitee also claims that while median family income
increased slightly since 1985 it is still below 1970 levels in terms of real purchasing power. Id.
at IX-X.
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it breaks down some old social barriers, but the implications for families with children have not been equally positive. When both parents

work, adequate substitute care for children becomes costly. Even
with two wage earners, many families are unable to afford that care,
and the society as a whole suffers when children's needs are neglected.28 Materialistically, the standard of living for working people
with two incomes may appear to have improved, but the social cost

may be higher than realized. A realistic national labor policy must
confront the issues of how the resultant problems should be met, and

how the financial costs of adequate child care for working families
can best be paid.
Today's social problems are, if anything, more complex than
those of 1935 and 1947, but they are equally inseparable from political and economic considerations. Today we are, as a nation, committed to primary human values which were not of much concern to the
nation as a whole in 1935 and 1947. This includes the social realization of the need for equality among all races and between the sexes,
while protecting individual freedoms.29 At the same time, the society

is becoming increasingly polarized, both socially and economically,
and much of that class-based polarization finds minority groups still
in severely disadvantaged positions.30 Work opportunities, education
28. See, e.g., id. This Report states that births to unmarried women have risen, while
those to married women have declined. Id. "Among blacks, more than 60 percent of births
now occur outside of marriage, as do about a third of Hispanic births and a sixth of white
births. Id. In 1988, 4.3 million children were being raised by unmarried parents, double the
number in 1980." Id. at 4. The Committee points out that 83 percent of persons in families
headed by never-married women received government assistance in the period 1983-1986,
compared to II percent in married families. Id. The number of children in foster care systems
has been increasing during the 1980s. Id. at 4-5. The number of child neglect and abuse
reports doubled during the 1980s. There were 2.2 million reports of child neglect or abuse in
1987. Id. at 9.
29. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, amended by Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972). The Taft-Hartley Act itself reflected a desire to give employees the right to refrain
from engaging in union activities by so amending section 7, and the right to refrain from
actually becoming members of labor unions, by so amending section 8(a)(3). Taft-Hartley
Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 101-503, 49 Stat. 449 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-163, 181-188 (1982)). Most of our significant personal rights under the U.S. Constitution, for example, rights of privacy and personhood, and to equal protection of the laws, have

been developed since that date. See, e.g., L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

1302-

671 (1978).
30. See supra note I1 and accompanying text. Robert Greenstein of the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities reports that the poorest fifth (20 percent) of the American population received only 4.6 percent of total national family income in 1988, which is the lowest
percentage since 1954, while the richest fifth received 44 percent, the highest percentage ever
recorded. The Plain Dealer, (Cleveland) Oct. 19, 1989, at A2, col. 3. "Number of poor remains 32 million." Id. In 1988 poverty rates were 10.1 percent for whites, 31.6 percent for
Blacks, and 26.8 percent for Hispanics. Id. The impact of economic polarization on Black
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for the knowledge and skills essential to work effectively in today's
more sophisticated industries, opportunities for advancement, and
the means to secure wages that will provide a decent standard of
living, are all basic elements of the complex social problems confronting us. 3 In addition, as workers become more skilled and have
more education, they seek jobs that satisfy their desire to contribute
more than physical labor in the workplace. 32 These matters need to
families is illustrated by 1987/88 statistics on poverty. Id. Black families were only 11.3 percent of the total families in the U.S. in the year up to March 1988, but poor Black families
constituted 32 percent of the total poor families in the United States. Id. Of the total number
of Black families in the United States, 30 percent were below the poverty level that year,
compared to 8 percent of the total white families. Id. A significantly higher percentage of
Black below-poverty-level families were headed by unemployed householders (61 percent) than
were white families (49 percent). Id.; see also BUREAU OF CENSUS, supra note 13, at table 20
(providing extrapolation of percentages in tables).
31. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. As President Woodrow Wilson, in his first
inaugural address, so eloquently proclaimed:
We have been proud of our industrial achievements, but we have not hitherto
stopped thoughtfully enough to count the human cost, the cost of lives snuffed out,
of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and spiritual cost to the men
and women and children upon whom the dead weight and burden of it all has fallen
pitilessly the years through. The groans and agony of it all had not yet reached our
ears, the solemn, moving undertone of our life, coming up out of the mines and
factories, and out of every home where the struggle had its intimate and familiar
seat. With the great Government went many deep secret things which we too long
delayed to look into and scrutinize with candid, fearless eyes. The great Government
we loved has too often been made use of for private and selfish purposes, and those
who used it had forgotten the people....
Nor have we studied and perfected the means by which government may be put
at the service of humanity, in safeguarding the health of the Nation, the health of
its men and its women and its children, as well as their rights in the struggle for
existence. This is no sentimental duty. The firm basis of government is justice, not
pity. These are matters of justice. There can be no equality of opportunity, the first
essential of justice in the body politic, if men and women and children be not
shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of great industrial
and social processes which they cannot alter, control, or singly cope with. Society
must see to it that it does not itself crush or weaken or damage its own constitutent
parts. The first duty of law is to keep sound the society it serves. Sanitary laws, pure
food laws, and laws determining conditions of labor which individuals are powerless
to determine for themselves are intimate parts of the very business of justice and
legal efficiency.
Woodrow Wilson InauguralAddress (March 4, 1913), reprinted in U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 200, 200-02
(1965).
32. This may be one reason for the current interest in employee workplace participation
schemes which, to varying degrees, allow workers at various levels to share in the ongoing
process of plant and office decision-making. See generally S. SCHLOSSBERG & S. FETTER, U.S.
LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

104 (1986); St. An-

toine, The Legal and Economic Implications of Union-Management Cooperation: The Case of
GM and the UAW, PROC. OF N.Y.U. FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL NAT'L. CONF. ON LAB, at 8-1
(1988); C. BALFOUR, PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY (1973). In any event, modern technology is
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be examined to formulate a meaningful national labor policy.
B.

Political Values

The notion of industrial democracy33 is one political value that
can be served by meaningful collective bargaining resulting in a
binding contractual arrangement between employees and employers. 3 4 Employee workplace and management participation schemes
of all sorts are other forms of industrial democracy. Both of these

schemes require recognition of some level of employee rights in the
employment relationship and give the employees at least a small

voice in the workplace. However, it is important to emphasize that
even such minimal rights which are represented by this "voice" cannot be taken for granted in the United States.
Except for contractual relations, rights of employees to have
jobs and to have rights in those jobs have never been acknowledged

as worthy of basic common law or constitutional protection in the
United States. 35 The opposite is true. The fiction attributed to Hor-

ace Wood in the late 19th century is that in the absence of contract
or statutory restriction, all employment is "at will" and may be ter-

minated without cause by either the employer or employee.36 This is
still the fundamental law of employment in the United States.
Clearly the interests served by this doctrine are predominantly those
changing the workplace and is requiring greater skills and knowledge on the part of employees.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
33. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960) (stating that "[a] collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of
industrial self-government."); see also Walther, The System Works Well, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 260 (1987).
34. Under our current law, the signatories to a collective bargaining agreement are the
union, representing the employees, and the employer. Unions may maintain actions on behalf
of employees under the agreement. Smith v. Evening News Assoc., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Individual employees may, however, maintain suits against their employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. See Delcostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
35. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to extend constitutional protection to
some employment rights through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but instead gave that clause a very restricted meaning.
Id. Presumably Congress still could legislate such rights under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, by exercising its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
36. See Bierman & Youngblood, Employment-at-Will and the South CarolinaExperiment, 7 INDUs. REL. L.J. 28, 29 (1984). The authors contend that the concept of employmentat-will made its first appearance in Wood's treatise on master and servant law in 1877, and
that his statement inspired the courts to reject the previously followed English rule that in the
absence of agreement, a term of employment was presumed to be for a period of one year. Id.;
see also Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT.
118 (1976).
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of the employer.
Some, but probably relatively few, employers voluntarily recognize and honor the rights of employees, 37 notwithstanding the employment at will doctrine, because they consider industrial democracy as a political value deserving of encouragement and protection.
There is no law securing to employees the right to even have a voice
in the workplace or requiring employers to enter into collective bargaining agreements with their employees.3 8 Even if employers consent to alter the employment rights of employees contractually, or if
they consent to worker participation schemes, it usually is easy for
employers to terminate such arrangements.3 9 Except for the most
minimal protection, most of it statutory, the common law of employment has not advanced democratic values in the workplace.
Even in industries with long histories of constructive collective
bargaining relations between employers and unions, industrial democracy is threatened because of a number of Supreme Court decisions. The Court decisions provided employers with tempting opportunities to destroy or at least subvert the relationship if doing so
might be advantageous.40 The right to strike was the one weapon
unions used to have to secure agreements favorable to employees.
Today, as a result of the court decisions, the strike has been rendered nearly as useless as a cap pistol in an atomic war. 41 Likewise,
37.

For a recent example of enlightened treatment of employees by a private employer,

see Berman, "Goat Cheese, Anyone?," FORBES 220 (Sept. 18, 1989) (regarding the former
owners of the Coach Bag Company).
38. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). This is one of the

many anomolies of the National Labor Relations Act, that it requires both parties to bargain
in good faith (sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d)) but does not require them to reach an agreement on
any terms). Id.

39.

It is, of course, possible for an employer to enter into a contract of indefinite dura-

tion with an employee. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (Ct. App. 1981). But some courts have construed such agreements as being terminable at
will. See Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10,
499 A.2d 515 (1985). See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT
LAW, ch. 11 (1987) (noting that the right to continuous employment, unless the employer has

just cause for termination,

is granted to university professors under most tenure

arrangements).
Under the NLRB's contract bar rules, a collective bargaining agreement will bar a new

union certification for a maximum of three years. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR
LAW 273 (10th ed. 1986). There is no statutory or common law protection for worker participation schemes in the United States. However, several European nations have mandated them

legislatively and the European Economic Community has encouraged all member states to
adopt such plans. See

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN: REPORT OF THE COMMIT-

24, 25 (1977).
40. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S.
Ct. 1225 (1989).
41. See, e.g., id.; see also American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB
TEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
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the security of the job protections contained in many of those agreements has been virtually nullified recently by the Supreme Court.42

All that remains of "industrial democracy" in collective bargaining
arrangements is what the all-powerful employer consents to. That is

sham democracy at best. If we have secured a measure of industrial
peace as its result, that too will pass as soon as the illusion of employee rights and powers wears off.

The one aspect of industrial democracy that seems to be preserved, perhaps because it is too clearly written in the NLRA for

easy dismissal by the courts, is the right of the employees to engage
in or refrain from engaging in union or other organizational activities for mutual aid or protection.43 However, even that fundamental
associational right is problematic in the workplace. Employees who
try to organize against the wishes of their employers find themselves

and their jobs at risk from employer retaliatory action. They have
some statutory remedies,44 but those are expensive and time-consuming 45 and don't begin to compensate for the trouble and pain (or cost
to the public46) of trying to put this form of industrial democracy
into action in a hostile environment. For unions to organize employees is a difficult process, for unless they can prove to the satisfaction
of the Board or a court that they have no other alternative means to
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
42. See Trans World Airlines, 109 S. Ct. 1225. Although the Trans World Airlines case
was decided under the Railway Labor Act, the Supreme Court relied heavily in its analysis on
decisions under the National Labor Relations Act. See id.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
44. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it "an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere, restrain or coerce the employees in the exercise of their rights" under section 7. See
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Furthermore, section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to discriminate against employees in order to discourage or encourage union
membership. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). Employees who are discharged in violation of
either section may be reinstated with back pay if the NLRB finds that an unfair labor practice
was committed by the employer. Id. The NLRB in that case will issue a cease and desist order
against the employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). If the employer does not voluntarily
comply with the order, the NLRB must seek enforcement in one of the United States Courts
of Appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). The employer may also seek such review. 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1982).
45. The average time from the filing of a charge through the final decision of the National Labor Relations Board itself, was 660 days in 1984. See 49 NLRB ANN. REP., table 23,
at 234 (1984). It is not possible to accurately estimate the time or cost of completing an appeal
of a case in one of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, but a further two years would not seem unreasonable if the Court decided to grant full review on the merits instead of summarily disposing
of the case. There were 286 cases reviewed by the various Courts of Appeals in 1984, of which
187 affirmed Board orders in full. 49 NLRB ANN. REP., table 19A, at 230 (1984). A further
four cases were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
46. The National Labor Relations Board expenditures for fiscal year 1983-84 amounted
to nearly $132 million. 49 NLRB ANN. REP., table 23, at 234 (1984).
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reach the employees with their message, they can be legally denied
entry to the employer's property to distribute literature and authorization cards to the employees."'
Indeed the value of democracy in the workplace has active opposition in the form of other conflicting values that represent employers' interests in the employment relationship almost exclusively.
Chief among these other values is the protection of private property
rights of owners of businesses against all but the most limited intrusion mandated by clear statutory or common law directives. Thus,
the law of owners' private real property rights has been interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court to mean, as suggested above, that employees have a right to be on their employer's premise, (as "invitees"?), during non-working times and in non-working areas, to discuss and per chance to encourage representation by labor unions in
negotiations with their employer.48 However, the unions, which cannot legally represent the employees of the employer without securing
authorization cards from a large percentage of the employees except
in the rarest circumstances,49 cannot send representatives onto the
employer's property, not even a parking lot, to provide the employees
with the necessary information and encouragement to seek representation. 50 Thus, the organizational requisites to the majority representation that is an essential condition precedent to collective bargaining under our current law is severely limited by common law
concepts of owners' real property rights.5 1 Organization may be a
"right" and a form of industrial democracy, but it is not one to be
taken for granted. 2 Nor is it, by itself, of any significant practical
47. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
48. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
49. NLRB Statements of Procedure,reprinted as amended in 29 C.F.R. § 101 (1987).
Section 101.18(c) provides:
[It is] the Board's administrative experience that in the absence of special factors
the conduct of an election serves no purpose under the statute unless the petitioner
has been designated by at least 30 percent of the employees.

Id.
50.
51.

Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105.
See generally H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 392 (1940).

52. See Alleyne, Commentary, in AMERICAN LABOR LAW 114 (Morris, ed. 1987);
Bakaly, A Response to Murphy's Law, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 78 (Morris, ed. 1987);
Benn, A Voice From the Trenches, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 95 (Morris, ed. 1987); Irving,
The Board's Representation Process' Another View, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 109 (Morris, ed. 1987); Murphy, Establishment and Disestablishment of Union Representation, in
AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 61 (Morris, ed. 1987); Craver, The Declining Status of the National Labor Relations Act, PROC. OF N.Y.U. FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 3-1
(1988); Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation,
31 BUFFALO L. REV. 9, 19-23 (1982); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
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value.
Other forms of private property rights, such as the rights of

owners, or their managerial representatives, to make decisions about
running the business even though those decisions impact on the em-

ployees' interests, pose increasingly impressive obstacles to the realization of industrial democracy.53
To a limited extent provided by statutory guarantees, employees

have rights that theoretically intrude on ownership and managerial
rights, for example, the right to be free-from discrimination for the

purpose of encouraging or discouraging union activity, 5 or the right
to bargain with the employer about certain decisions or certain ef-

fects of decisions, taken by the employer, which affect the employees.55 But as a result of a long series of Supreme Court decisions,
which will be discussed in a later section of this Article,5" those employee statutory rights have been severely curtailed in the interest of
employers' rights to control their businesses.57

Another employer property right inheres in the fundamental
premise of business (especially corporate) law as it has developed as

a conceptually distinct body of legal doctrine. The premise is that it
is the primary function of a business to make a profit for its owners. 58 In the case of corporations, the managers who actually run the
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769 (1983). See generally Oshinski,
Challenges of Organizing, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 57 (1983) (discussing the
practical problems encountered in a particular union organizing campaign).
53. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666-(1981); Otis Elevator Co. (United Technologies), 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984); cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
55. Id. Compare First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666 with FibreboardPaper
Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. 203.
56. See infra text accompanying note 82.
57. As one example, employees' statutorily protected right to strike (NLRA section 13)
has been at the very least made less meaningful as an economic weapon by Supreme Court
decisions granting the employer the right to lockout employees who have not struck. See infra
note 113 and accompanying text.
58. Principlesof CorporateGovernance (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984), reprinted in Perkins,
The ALI CorporateGovernance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1229 (1986). Section 2.01 of the Draft provides:
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities
with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain, except that, whether
or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the corporation,
in the conduct of its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law,
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and
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business are held accountable to the owners for their actions at least

partially on the basis of that fundamental premise.59 This has led to
the situation, familiar to all law students, that for purposes of business law policy, labor is simply a factor of the cost of doing business.
Good business policy requires keeping that cost to the lowest amount
practicable under the circumstances in order to maximize returns to
the owners. 60 Although this premise may have some analytical utility
in measuring corporate performance and the adherence of managers
to sensible business practices, it does not warrant ranking it with
other, more humanely oriented social policies.6 " The risk of legaliz(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
Id.
The latitude for the generosity suggested by subsection (c) is usually reserved in practice
for charitable contributions and/or compensation for managerial employees and directors who
have performed services for the corporation under the business judgment rule, and is limited
by the demands of reasonableness. See, e.g., Hutton v. West Cork Railway, 23 Ch. D. 654,
673 (1883) (wherein Justice Brown stated that "[t]he law does not say that there are to be no
cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit
of the company.").
59. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). The Dodge case
stated that:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.
Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
60. See E.H. PHELPS BROWN, supra note 8, at 49, stating:
Economists . . . have sometimes tried to trace all output back to ultimate factors of
production that make, but have not themselves been made. They have found these
factors in labor, waiting, and land, or the gifts of nature. It is hard, however, to
imagine what labor in that unshaped shape could be like. Every man is what he is,
and works as he does, through nurture as well as nature: what sort of producer he
will be depends on what sort of product he is.
Moreover, labor as a factor of production is discussed in most economic treatises. See, e.g., P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMicS 509, 509-29 (7th ed. 1967). See generally L. REYNOLDS. ECONOMICS
370 (4th ed. 1973) (discussing the concept of profit maximation).
61. The New Deal policies of President Franklin Roosevelt that led to the enactment of
the original National Labor Relations Act were inspired, at least in part, by such policies. In
his first inaugural address, President Roosevelt stated:
The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of the
restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere
monetary profit.
Happiness lies not in the mere possession of money, it lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort. The joy and moral stimulation of work no
longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits. These dark days
will be worth all they cost us if they teach us that our true destiny is not to be
ministered unto but to minister to ourselves and to our fellow men.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss1/2

16

1989]

8(a)(3)
Baker: NLRA Section
the Search for a National Labor Policy
NLRA 8(a)(3)
Sectionand

ing regulation of labor law is that the familiar policies of the law of

business will begin to take on a life of their own, and come to appear
as deserving of special protection. 62 Thus, unless there is some prospect of greater production and greater profits flowing from instituting programs that serve social and democratic political values, the
tendency of business managers to resist programs that encourage

democratic participation by employees or that grant increased benefits to them will persist.6 3 Such resistance, unless clearly unlawful,

will often receive the sympathy of judges if for no other reason than
because the judges also were schooled so extensively in business law

in law school. Thus, employment values other than profit-making
must be clearly spelled out if they are to be respected by employers
and by the courts.
The system of private property rights, as it has been interpreted
and applied to labor relations issues since the Wagner Act was en-

acted, occasionally has been endowed with an importance equal to
Franklin Roosevelt's Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933, reprinted in U.S. GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 236 (1965).
Four years later he commented:
Our progress out of the depression is obvious. But that is not all that you and I
mean by the new order of things. Our pledge was not merely to do a patchwork job
with secondhand materials. By using the new materials of social justice we have
undertaken to erect on the old foundations a more enduring structure for the better
use of future generations.
In that purpose we have been helped by achievements of mind and spirit. Old
truths have been relearned; untruths have been unlearned. We have always known
that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics.
Out of the collapse of a prosperity whose builders boasted their practicality has
come the conviction that in the long run economic morality pays. We are beginning
to wipe out the line that divides the practical from the ideal; and in so doing we are
fashioning an instrument of unimagined power for the establishment of a morally
better world.
This new understanding undermines the old admiration of worldly success as
such. We are beginning to abandon our tolerance of the abuse of power by those
who betray for profit the elementary decencies of life.
Franklin Roosevelt's, Second InauguralAddress, January 20, 1937, reprinted in U.S. GovERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 240

(1965); see also D. ZISKIND, CONCERNING HUMAN ASPIRATION, ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW 156-58 (1985).

62. See generally P. SELZNICK. LAW. SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969) (analyzing the general problems of private property concepts as applied to the actual functioning of
business, and of the realities of corporate social changes).
63. For example, some types of workplace employee cooperation programs have proved
more acceptable to some employers in recent years, where they have resulted in improved
quality of production and/or lowered costs. Such programs may also improve the quality of
working life for the employees in addition to increasing efficiency. See Analysis: Evaluation of
Cooperative Practices Creates Challenges for Union Leaders, 132 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 9
(Sept. 4, 1989); St. Antoine, supra note 32, at VIII(a).
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some constitutional rights.6 4 The United States Constitution does not
protect property rights as fundamental values, but indeed extends
only limited protections to them through the provisions that government shall not interfere with them without due process of law, and
that there shall be no taking of private property for public use without just compensation. 5 At most, the fundamental property values
that have been cast in opposition to employee interests by the courts
are fundamental only because the courts say they are. What this has
meant in practice is that the ultimate control over prevalent values
in the employment relation is given to those who own, or represent
owners, of the real or personal property utilized in business.6 6 The
vast majority of those individuals whose work is essential to the operations of business lack meaningful democratic influence over the values that prevail in the system because they lack the power that has
64. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), the Supreme Court stated that for an employer to entirely close a business in order to avoid unionization was not an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, even though prompted by anti-union motivation. The Court distinguished a partial closing designed to discourage union organization of employees in other parts of the employer's
business empire, which would be an unfair labor practice against the employees of those other
related businesses whose union activities would be "chilled," from a total closing, which would
deprive all of the employees of the closed plant their jobs permanently, and would not, in the
ruling of the Court, be an unfair labor practice. Id. The Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals that a total closing would not be an unfair labor practice because the employer has
the right to go out of business completely for any reason whatever, even a reason condemned
by the Act. Id. However, this decision is well criticized. See, e.g., Summers, Labor Law In The
Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 63 (1965).
Another example of employer property rights taking precedence over union organizational
rights is found in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). Here, however, the
Court conceded that there would be a modicum of room for balancing this property right
against the employees' rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act in the event
that the union found access to the employees impossibly difficult by any other means than
visits to the employer's property. Id. Moreover, the NLRB has ordered access in a few instances as remedies for aggravated employer unfair labor practices. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R.
GORMAN supra note 39. However, the cases allowing the unions access under such circumstances are extremely rare in practice.

65. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, § i.
66. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union, 380 U.S. 263. In Darlington the Court held that
not even proof of an employer's anti-union animus could block the employer's right to close his
entire business rather than deal with the union, even though this meant the loss of jobs to all of
the employees in the plant. Id. The case was remanded to the Board for determination of the
issue whether the employer had in fact closed its entire business, or had used the shutdown of
the Darlington plant as a means of "chilling unionism" among other employees of the employer in other plants. Id. at 277. Fortunately for the Darlington employees, the Board found
on remand that the plant had been closed with the purpose of deterring unionism at other
establishments of the employer, and this decision was sustained by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. See Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
den., 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); Summers, supra note 64 (providing an excellent - if not scathing
- analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion).
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been conferred by law on the owners of property.67

Even the economic power the employees once had, to walk away
from their jobs en masse, thereby shutting down the employer's operations, has been emasculated to the point of disappearance by a series of Supreme Court decisions. Employers now may: (1) hire temporary or permanent replacement for strikers and continue operating

their businesses; 6s (2) offer substantial inducements to strikebreakers, even when this means taking away some seniority-related bene-

fits formerly possessed by the striking employees;69 (3) lock out employees to gain economic advantages over the union;70 and (4)
institute unilateral changes in employment terms and conditions
when the terms have been offered to the union in bargaining and
impasse has been reached over those terms. 1 Without this collective
economic power, employees are increasingly powerless to insist on
workplace democracy.
C. Economic Values
It is tempting to postulate that economic values do not exist in
isolation from social and political values of the society. Perhaps it is
67. Employee ownership of part or all of a business clearly would give the employees
power to determine the values and policies of the firm as owners (but perhaps not in their
capacity as employees. See, e.g., Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New
Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 441
(1982-83). The point of the statement in the text is simply that as a matter of law that employees in their capacity as employees generally lack the legal power to influence workplace
values and policies, unless the employer/owner consents to let them do so through the vehicle
of collective bargaining agreements, or through the establishment of employee workplace participation schemes of one sort or another. See generally C. BALFOUR, supra note 32. An employer is under no legal compulsion in our law to consent to either a collective bargaining
agreement or to workplace participation. Id. This is not the case in certain other industrialized
countries. Id.
68. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). On July 21, 1989, Rep.
Thomas M. Fogietta introduced H.R. 2969 to amend the National Labor Relations Act to
make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to hire, or threaten to hire, permanent
replacements for strikers. H.R. REP. No. 2969, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); see also 144
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 3 (Aug. 25, 1989) (referring to House Committee on Education and
Labor).
69. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225
(1989).
70. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). Several cases involve
multi-employer bargaining units that respond to union whipsaw strike tactics with lockouts.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S.
87 (1957) (Buffalo Linen case). See generally Summers, supra note 65 (analyzing the implications of American Ship Bldg. Co. and Brown).
71. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 n.12 (1962). The Court in Katz, held that the employer violated NLRA section 8(a)(5) by instituting unilateral changes that had not previously
been offered to the union during contract negotiations. See id.
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possible to conclude that economic values must be made subordinate
to social and political needs. But that is not the same as concluding
that in drafting any new national labor policy, one can ignore the
independent importance of economic values in a global economy as
complex and interdependent as ours has become since the Wagner
Act was written.72
American working people, at least in major industries, are now
in serious competition with overseas workers for jobs to produce
products that the American public buys. 73 Another factor in the economic picture has been the failure of major American industries,
such as steel, to invest in the modern technology needed to remain
competitive with other technologically advanced nations.74
The web of problems besetting us economically, including foreign indebtedness, insolvency of financial institutions, bankruptcy of
major businesses and farms, a national debt that has no limit in sight
(and no sign of ever being repayable), as well as a huge burden of
consumer indebtedness, may limit what can be accomplished economically for working people solely through the mechanism of a
new, well-defined national labor policy. It may be, as Jane Jacobs
has suggested, that the United States is rapidly becoming a third
world nation, condemned to an ever lower standard of living with a
resultant destruction of social quality" (absent some miracle of spontaneous internal revitalization). 5 The average American employee's
72. See generally Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. Rev.
841 (1985) (analyzing economic problems in the labor field).
73. Merchandise imports into the United States exceed merchandise exports. See National Income and Product Accounts Tables, 69 SURV. OF CURRENT Bus. 11, table 4.4 (1989)

(containing figures on 1987, 1988 and estimates for 1989).
74. See Schroeder, And the Wolf Finally Came: The Decline of the American Steel
Industry, Bus. WK. Oct. 10, 1988, at 25. See generally Atleson, supra note 72 (discussing
economic problems in the labor field).

Moreover, increasing concentrations of capital in recent decades, especially in the form of
conglomerates and multi-national corporations, have contributed substantially to the deteriorating power of labor unions in the United States. See id. Concentrations of capital were
already perceived to pose a great threat to workers at the time the Wagner Act was first
introduced in 1934. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (Mar. 1, 1934) (statement of Rep. Wagner).
The lack of a highly educated and technologically skilled workforce in the United States

contributes to industrial decline. American education has failed to remain abreast of even the
most basic current needs of industry. See, e.g., Gerdel, Literacy Crunch Squeezes Firms' Ability to Compete, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Oct. 8, 1989, at 2E, col. 2.
This failure may be symptomatic of the economic problems besetting communities that

are unable to afford the kind and quality of education needed to train students adequately for
today's needs, coupled with the increased difficulty that may be associated with teaching students who have suffered the discouraging and debilitating effects of discriminatory treatment
and/or poverty from an early age.

75.

J. JACOES, CITIES AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC LIFE
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living standard may be less a result of lack of bargaining power than

it is of underlying weakness in the total economic structure.1 The
decline in the standard of living under this view may be more a problem of not enough pie rather than of how the pie has been divided.
One tends to be suspicious of notions that poverty or lowered
standards of living are necessary or that they are the inevitable re-

sult of high debt or stiff foreign competition. This is a nation rich in
both human and natural resources and one that does not suffer from

overpopulation. The example of some of the smaller European nations, such as Great Britain and Denmark, would suggest that the

general standard of living, access to essential services, and even the
length of the work day and vacation allowances, are less dependent
on world economic position than on notions of distributive justice.
If we do not have enough pie to satisfy everyone now, perhaps we
should make more with the ingredients we unquestionably have on
hand, and see that more of it goes to those who need it most.78
In any event, there are broad areas of employment, especially in
the retail and service industries, that undoubtedly would benefit from
more equitable wage setting and distribution. There is plenty of

room for wage improvements at the bottom of existing pay scales.7 9
(1984).
76. The problems are considered to be primarily political questions of power rather than
purely economic, See Atleson, supra, note 72; see also Klare, Judicial Deradicalizationof the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV.
265 (1978).
77. See Friis, Issues in Social Security Policies in Denmark, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

(Jenkins, ed. 1969) [hereinafter

SOCIAL SECURITY]

(concerning

Denmark); see also C. BALFOUR, supra note 32, at 202-03 (concerning Denmark). In England,
government attitudes toward social policy and social welfare undoubtedly have changed during
the period in which Margaret Thatcher has been Prime Minister, but the basic system of
social benefits, put into place and then refined by a succession of governments, mainly but not
entirely those led by the Labour Party, remains. See, e.g., Titmuss, New Guardians of the
Poor in Britain, in SOCIAL SECURITY, supra, at 151.
According to news reports, the International Labor Organization recently completed a
study indicating that American workers have the shortest vacations, with fewer than nine days
after a full year of employment, while those in western Europe have the longest, some based on
statutory entitlements, some on collective bargaining agreements, and some on custom. See
Want More Vacation Time? Get a Job in Western Europe, Los Angeles Times, July 12, 1989,
Part 4, (Business), at 3 (summarizing this report). The report indicates that in West Germany,
for example, nearly two-thirds of the work force is given six weeks of paid vacation, even
though the legal entitlement is three weeks. Id. Statutes provide for five-week paid leaves in
France, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, and in some of those countries collective
bargaining agreements result in longer vacations. Most British employees have at least four
weeks paid leave. Id.
78. This was unquestionably the attitude of Senator Wagner's at the time the National
Labor Relations Act was introduced. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (Mar. 1, 1934).
79. Retail workers receive the lowest pay in the United States, an average of only
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The public will not suffer harm if decent wages mean the end of
ninety-nine cent hamburger promotions or free soft drinks in some of
the fast food restaurants. There also appears to be room for negotiating improvements for the many thousands of employees who work
nearly full-time at "part-time" jobs, or who work full-time for long
periods at "temporary" jobs, and who, as a consequence of this arbitrary status, often receive lower rates of pay and are denied the important fringe benefits (e.g., medical insurance and retirement plans)
that are given to regular full-time employees. 80 If these employees
had meaningful rights under a new national labor policy they would
be able to bargain their way to a higher pay scale, benefits and tenure equity comparable to other employees."
$189.51 per week. Average Annual Salaries, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 77, table 17 (1989).
On the basis of a 52 week year, that amounts to an annual salary of $9,854.52. Id. This is well
below the poverty level for a family of four. The private sector average wage is $332.43 per
week, or $17,286.36 a year. Id. This does not appear to be overly generous, either. The top pay
scale among employees is currently received by petroleum and coal workers, who receive
$657.73 per week, or $34,201.96 a year. See id.
Since all of these figures are averages, it means that some employees in all categories are
paid more or less than the figures shown. Since the minimum wage is still under $4.00 an
hour, the legal lowest wage would be less than $160 a week or $8,320 a year for a 40 hour
week, 52 week year. Id.
80. Statistics indicate that, with the exception of mining and manufacturing employees,
the average hours worked by employees in the United States is under 40 hours a week. In the
retail trade, the average hours worked per week is only 29.1. In the service trade the average
hours worked per week is 32.5 which indicates that many employees in these groups are parttime.
For example, in Cleveland, the Regional Transit Authority regularly hires bus drivers on
a part-time basis after they have finished a training period. The part-time workers are allowed
to work up to 30 hours per week, usually as relief drivers. They are required to pay union dues.
They receive a lower hourly rate of pay than full-time drivers, and do not receive certain fringe
benefits, such as prepaid health insurance and paid vacations. It often takes longer than a year
for a part-time driver to be eligible for a full-time position in this system.
A similar practice is followed in many institutions, including some state universities in
Ohio, with respect to housekeeping employees. For example, one person worked for several
years as a part-time housekeeping employee, usually working more than 30 hours a week,
before finally receiving a full-time position. The part-time position carried no employer-paid
fringe benefits, but both the employer and employee did contribute to the state pension fund,
which was mandatory under Ohio law.
Therefore, it is a myth to think that such part-time employees only want part-time work.
Many of them are simply lining up for full-time jobs when those become available. However,
in some systems there is no guarantee that part-time employees will be accepted for full-time
jobs on the basis of seniority. Some employers reserve the right to fill available full-time jobs
with other employees, including new hires. These practices warrant closer examination by the
Department of Labor, and reporting by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
81. The danger is that part-time and temporary employees might not have sufficient
voice in a bargaining unit if the majority of unit employees are full-time, and have the power
to trade off the pay and benefits of part-time or temporary employees as a way of keeping their
own salaries and benefit levels high. Such selfishness is not unheard of in labor unions. See
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Legislative limits on the exploita-
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The economic realities confronting the nation should be consid-

ered carefully in drafting a new national labor policy. But a very
careful consideration should make it possible for us to distinguish the
economic realities from the economic hocus pocus that has led some
people to conclude that not much can be done to make our nation a
better and fairer place to work and live than it is now.

III. NLRA

POLICY AS IT is Now: THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 8(a)(3)

Since the Wagner Act became law in 1935, the Act in general
and what is now section 8(a)(3) in particular, have been thoroughly
analyzed and criticized by numerous scholars.82 It is not the intention, in this section, to repeat the lengthy and exhaustive analyses of
the Act or the cases that have been decided under it. The existing
large body of scholarly work, much of which either has been or will
be referred to more than once in footnotes in this Article, should be
consulted for further analysis of leading cases - as, of course,
should the cases themselves. 8"
tion of probationary, part-time and temporary workers might be preferable as a cure for this
problem, or simply a provision in the law that such employees shall not be discriminated
against in terms of pay rates and benefits by either employers or unions.
82. See, e.g., Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 4; Cox, supra note 4; see also Getman,
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHIc. L.
REV. 735 (1965) [hereinafter Getman, Section 8(a)(3)]; Lieb, Constructive Discharge Under
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Study in Undue Concern Over Motives, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 143 (1985); Oberer, The Scienter Factorin Sections 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491
(1967); Summers, supra note 64; Note, Provingan 8(a)(3) Violation: The ChangingStandard,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 866 (1966).
83. See generally, Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 4; Cox, supra note 4; Getman,

Section 8(a)(3), supra note 82; Getman, The Protectionof Economic Pressureby Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967); Janofsky, New Concepts
in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship Building
and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM,. L. REV. 81 (1970); Kowal, The Shocking State of the
Board's Section 8(a)(3) Decisions, 4 INDUs. REL. L.J. 308 (1981); Lieb, supra note 82; Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 87 (1965); Oberer, supra note 82; Shieber, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act; A Rationale: Part L Discrimination,29 LA.

L. REV. 46 (1968); Shieber & Moore, Section 8(a)(3) of the NationalLaborn Relations Act. A
Rationale - Part II,
Encouragement or Discouragement of Membership in any Labor Organization and the Significance of Employer Motive, 33 LA. L. REV. 1 (1972); Summers, supra
note 64; Ward, "Discrimination" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1152
(1939); Ward, Proof of "Discrimination" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 7 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 797 (1939); Note, NLRB v. TransportationManagement Corp.: Allocation of
the Burden of Proof in Section 8(a)(3) Mixed Motive Discharge Cases, 33 CATH. U.L. REV.
279 (1983) (authored by Joanne S. Marchetta); Comment, TransportationManagement: The
Validation of Wright Line, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 185 (1984) (authored by Peter G. Albert);

Note, Proving an 8(a)(3) Violation: The Changing Standard, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 866 (1966)
[hereinafter Proving an 8(a)(3) Violation]; Note, Determining a Standard of Causationfor
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Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization:8 4
In the Wagner Act, the section contained a proviso intended to

legitimatize the closed shop. 5 This was repealed by the Taft-Hartley
Act amendments of 1947,18 and was replaced with language stating

that a collectively bargained agreement for a union shop would not
be unlawful under this section, provided certain safeguards were
met.8 7 But there is no other activity, lawful or unlawful, specified in
the statute as being either in or out of the prohibition of discrimination for the purposes stated, nor is "discrimination" itself defined. A
chronological examination of the Supreme Court's section 8(a)(3)
decisions reveals that, for the most part, the Court has decided what
the provision means and how it should be applied to a variety of
factual situations in the cases it has accepted for review. 88 The Court
DiscriminatoryDischarges Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 59
WASH. U.L.Q. 913 (1981) (authored by Mark S. Hochman).
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3) (1982).
85. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935),
repealed by Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)' Act of 1947, § 101, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136, 140-41 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)); see also 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 3270
(1985). Under the original closed shop proviso, an employer and union could agree that membership in the union was a condition of employment. See § 8(3), 49 Stat. 449, 459 (1935).
86. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 101, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136, 140-41 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982)).
87. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, § 101, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 36, 140-41 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 151-166 (1982)). Under the
union shop proviso, a union and an employer may agree that employees must join the union
within 30 days of employment in order to retain their jobs. Id. However, "membership" is
effectively limited by the second proviso to payment of dues and initiation fee, and employment cannot be denied to the employee who was not given membership on the same terms and
conditions as other employees. Id. See generally NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734 (1963) (discussing the limitations regarding the union shop provision).
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). The Court has undertaken to review section 8(a)(3)
cases for purposes of determining the sufficiency of the evidence on numerous occasions, especially when the issue of employer motivation was raised. See NLRB v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
The standard of evidentiary proof required under the National Labor Relations Act, and
the power of the appellate courts to review Board decisions for sufficiency of evidence, were
significantly changed by the Court's decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951). The Universal Camera Court interpreted and applied the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), to the National Labor
Relations Act. Id. This decision led to heightened scrutiny of the Board's decisions by the
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has also occasionally stated that some deference is owed to the expertise of the Board, usually when it agrees with the Board's decision.8 9 The Supreme Court has not contributed much clarity to the
analysis of the Act. However, some patterns have emerged from the
Court's controversial decisions, concerning the meaning and application of the statute as well as the standards and burdens of proof
necessary to find a violation of its unfair labor practice provisions."

The continuing controversy over section 8(a)(3) has spawned
much litigation,9

and has inspired numerous scholarly articles.

courts. Id. at 490.
89. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
90. What emerges, as the text following this note discloses, is that there are different
legal standards for different factual situations. What also emerges in the text is that the Supreme Court increasingly has decided on the meaning of the Act, especially since the TaftHartley Act was passed in 1947, instead of leaving that decision-making to the Board. The
Court of course does not review more than a tiny fraction of the cases coming from the Board
and the Courts of Appeals, and so those bodies also have a tremendous impact on the way the
law has developed. The "Reagan" Board has been subject to particularly heavy criticism in
recent years for decisions that are perceived to be anti-labor. See, e.g., Craver, Declining Status of the National Labor Relation Act, N.Y.U. FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL NAT'L CONF. ON LAB.
3-15; see also W. Liebman, "Recent Developments Under the National Labor Relations Act:
Changes in Board Law During the Reagan Years," (April 1989) (paper presented at the 22nd
Annual Pacific Coast Labor Law Conference); REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRE-

SENTATIVES 98TH CONG., 2D SaSS., "THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW -

A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS" (Comm. Print 1984). Professor Weiler also casts a good deal of blame at
American employers and the "core" of the legal structure for the present state of labor law:

Contemporary American labor law more and more resembles an elegant tombstone
for a dying institution. While administrators, judges, lawyers, and scholars busy
themselves with sophisticated jurisprudential refinements of the legal framework for
collective bargaining, the fraction of the work force actually engaged in collective
bargaining is steadily declining. A major factor in this decline has been the skyrocketing use of coercive and illegal tactics - discriminatory discharges in particular by employers determined to prevent unionization of their employees. The core of the
legal structure must bear a major share of the blame for providing employers with
the opportunity and the incentives to use these tactics, which have had such a chilling effect on worker interest in trade union representation.

Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-OrganizationUnder the NLRA,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
91. In 1984, there were 13,177 NLRA section 8(a)(3) charges flied with the NLRB,
which comprised 53.1 percent of the total cases filed. See 49 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT (1984);
Weiler, supra note 90, at 1776 (providing statistics on years prior to 1984). Professor Weiler
makes the following comment about the significance of these figures to employee organizational efforts:
[A] determined anti-union employer has at its disposal a potent weapon with which

to demonstrate its power over the lives of its employees: the dismissal of selected
union activists, in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Dismissal has the immediate effect of rendering these union supporters unable to vote - a consequence
that by itself might tip the balance in a close election - and also excludes the
discharged employees from the plant, the setting in which they could have cam-
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Many attempts have been made in the law journal articles to formulate neutral, or at least nonpartisan, approaches to application of the
statute, such as "balancing" tests, 92 or other distinctions between
types of cases based on non-partisan features. 93 On the whole, however, the controversy is a partisan one, with the Supreme Court's
critics contending that the Court's decisions under section 8(a)(3)
have destroyed the Act's central purpose of encouraging collective
bargaining in order to give employees greater power in their relations with employers.94 Meanwhile, the Court's defenders generally
conclude that the Act was never intended to do more than protect
employees' organizational rights, and that the Court generally has
been correct in its applications of section 8(a)(3).15
On its simplest level section 8(a)(3) has two necessary elements;
(1) discrimination and (2) to encourage or discourage membership
in a labor union. 96 As it has been interpreted, the first requirement
does not necessarily require evidence of disparate treatment between
adherents to, or advocates of, union activity and non-union employees.9 7 Virtually any action an employer may take that adversely affects employees who are engaged in organization or other union-related activities will satisfy the "discrimination" element. 98 It is the
second element that has caused the greatest difficulty. Currently, the
paigned most effectively among their fellow employees. Even more importantly, the
dismissal of key union adherents gives a chilling edge to the warning that union
representation is likely to be more trouble for the employees than it is worth.
Id. at 1778 (footnotes ommitted).
92. See Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 4; Getman, Section 8(a)(3), supra note 82;
see also Proving an 8(a)(3) Violation, supra note 84.
93. Cox, supra note 4.
94. Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 4; Summers, supra note 64. See generally Atleson, supra note 72; Klare, supra note 76; Weiler, supra note 90,
95. Cox, supra note 4; Getman, Section 8(a)(3), supra note 82. The Supreme Court has
stated unequivocally that the National Labor Relations Act was never intended to do more
than protect employee organizational rights and provide a system of voluntary collective bargaining. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) (stating that
[s]ections 8(a)(1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority to assess the relative
economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party
or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power."); see also Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
96. See Radio Officers' Union, 347 U.S. at 39, 42-3. Christensen & Svanoe contend that
there are really three elements, the third being the requirement that the employer's action
"must take effect in the particular area of 'hire, tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.'" See Christensen & Svonoe, supra note 4.
97. In Radio Officers' Union, the employee discriminated against was a union member
who was discharged by the employer at the request of his union, for failing to follow the
union's desired hiring practices. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
98. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945); see Getman,
Section 8(a)(3), supra note 82, at 736-38.
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Court has interpreted the language "to encourage or discourage" to
mean that the Board must usually make a finding of subjective motivation or intent on the part of the employer to discourage or encourage union activity, or "anti-union animus" before a violation will
be found. 99 What this means in practice is that'even though the employer's acts have a natural and foreseeable tendency to discourage

union membership, or in fact do discourage it, they will not be considered unlawful unless anti-union motivation can be proved by independent evidence. It will not be possible to infer the motive from the
deed. Employer subjective motivation thus has become the critical
issue, and in the types of cases to which this test is applied, such

motivation is very difficult to prove.'

0

However, the Court in the past has sustained the Board in find-

ing an unfair labor practice in some cases under section 8(a)(3)
without proof of subjective motivation to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.' 0 ' One decision stated that a
99. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Local 357,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
100. An employer can easily refrain from stating or otherwise revealing an unlawful
motive, in which case there will be no record of subjective intent. If such intent cannot be
inferred from the effects of the employer's behavior on the employees, it must be proven by
substantial direct or circumstantial evidence on the record as a whole, and there will be no
such evidence if the employer has been careful to state reasons for his conduct other than
antagonism to the union. At that point, the person with the burden of proof, which is the
General Counsel in NLRB unfair labor practice cases, has the burden of proving that the
asserted reason either is false or merely pretextual. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). The reason could be held to be pretextual if it is inconsistent with earlier conduct of the employer toward employees in similar circumstances. See,
e.g., TransportationManagement Corp., 462 U.S. 393. The employer in these circumstances
has the best evidence of the reasons for taking the action he did, and it would not seem unfair
to put the burden on him to prove that his reasons for so acting were legitimate. In a discriminatory discharge case, such as TransportationManagement, even where the General Counsel
has managed to carry the burden of proving unlawful motivation, the employer still wins if he
can prove that even though his motive for discharging the employee was unlawful, the employee would in any event have been discharged for lawful reasons (that proof failed in the
Transportation Management case, however). See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note
39, at 227-30.
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., the Court, in an opinion by Justice Fortas, appeared
to utilize a variant analysis of the motivation requirement. 389 U.S. 315 (1967). The Fleetwood Trailer Court implied that it was following the analysis set out in Great Dane Trailer.
See id. The Court first implicitly suggested that the burden was on the employer under NLRA
section 8(a)(3) to present substantial evidence that its actions were motivated by business
justifications, and not by anti-union animus. Id. The employer's burden requirement should be
compared to the burden requirements that appear to have been imposed on the NLRB General
Counsel, who must use independent evidence to prove unlawful employer motivation. Id. Jus-
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necessary requirement is that employer actions are "inherently so
prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant economic
justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union
membership or other anti-union animus is required" to be found. 102
The Court has also stated that in some cases the inference of unlawful intent may be "so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the
'1 0 3
employer's protestations of innocent purpose.

Thus, at least three tests or standards of proof are suggested by
the Court as possible under section 8(a)(3): (1) in some cases specific proof of unlawful employer motivation must be present in the
record and a finding of such motivation made by the Board, based
upon the whole record;104 (2) in some cases involving employer actice Fortas appeared to take this approach based on Justice Warren's opinion in Great Dane
Trailer.See id.
The lack of employer-introduced evidence of lawful motivation caused Justice Fortas to
conclude that NLRA section 8(a)(3) had been violated because "no evidence of a proper motivation appeared in the record" and the employer's refusal to reinstate striking employees was
destructive of "important employee rights." Id. at 380 (quoting Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S.
26 (1967)). The analyses of the majority in both the Great Dane and Fleetwood Trailerscases
appear to be highly vulnerable today in view of the Court's changed composition. It is worth
noting that while both cases were decided after American Ship Building Co., they were decided by majorities that no longer exist and that appear to have little following among the
present Justices. The other "inherently discriminatory" cases do not discuss the issue of who
has the burden of proof of employer motivation.
102. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965) (stated in dictum).
103. Id. at 311-12. Note that this was definitely dictum, and that the Court did not cite
any prior authority for the proposition. See id. The Court may have felt that this was the gist
of the statement in the earlier Radio Officers' Union case. See 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954). That
statement was apparently dictum but with perhaps some inferential basis in the facts. Id. The
Radio Officers' Union Court stated that "an employer's protestation that he did not intend to
encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was
such encouragement or discouragement." Id.
It may also be more directly supported by the discussion of the Gaynor case in Radio
Officers. Id. at 51 (citing NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 345 U.S. 902 (1953)). In Gaynor, it
appears that the employer tried to offer evidence of lawful motivation, but the evidence was
rejected by the Board and even if the evidence was accepted, the Court concluded that it
would not have helped his case. See id.
104. This appears to be the test the Supreme Court applied, at least in part, in American Ship Bldg. Co. where, after reiterating that section 8(a)(3) "requires an intention to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate against the union," the Court stated:
"[t]here was not the slightest evidence and there was no finding that the employer was actuated by a desire to discourage membership in the union as distinguished from a desire to affect
the outcome of the particular negotiations in which it was involved." 380 U.S. at 313. The
Court then concluded "that where the intention proven is merely to bring about a settlement of
a labor dispute on favorable terms, no violation of section 8(a)(3) is shown." Id. However,
there is a danger in inferring from the Court's decision in this case, which held that the employer did not commit a violation of section 8(a)(3), that in a similar case, the existence of
proof of an improper motivation would necessarily lead the Court to approve a decision that a
section 8(a)(3) violation had occurred. Id. This danger exists because of the balance of the
Court's opinion, in which it took the position that only employee organizational activity is
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tion "inherently prejudicial to union interests" the proof of motivation may be dispensed with unless there is significant business justification for the employer's actions; 10 5 and (3) in some other cases, also
protected by the Act, and that the lockout in this case was engaged in for purposes of bringing
economic pressure to bear on the union. Id.; see Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, supra note 83,
at 99 (noting that the Court's distinction is "patently artificial"). This case can, and perhaps
should, be read as legitimizing the lockout as an economic weapon the employer is free to use
against the union in any economic dispute. If that is true, then anti-union motivation for purposes of section 8(a)(3) analysis appears to be irrelevant in this type of case unless there is also
proof that employee organizational rights are also adversely affected by the employer's lockout.
It is difficult to see how that could be proven in a situation where the union already represents
the employees and organizing is not taking place. The Court in American Ship Building Co.,
appeared to wall off employer economic activity altogether from the purposes of the unfair
labor practice provisions of the Act, and thus appeared to create an irrebuttable presumption
of lockout validity in a setting of purely economic disputes. See 380 U.S. 300. In any event,
one cannot know which analysis of American Ship Building Co., is correct unless and until the
Court decides an economic dispute case in which employer anti-union motivation has been
proven by substantial evidence on the record as whole.
105. This analysis was suggested, in dictum, by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963).
The outcome may well be the same when intent is founded upon the inherently
discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in such
cases must be held to intend the very consequences which foreseeably and inescapably flow from this action and if he fails to explain away, to justify or to characterize his actions as something different than they appear on their face, an unfair labor
practice charge is made.
Id. at 228 (citation omitted).
The Court went on to consider the situation where the employer does put forth a legitimate business jusification in a situation where the conduct is discriminatory and does discourage union membership, and stated concerning it:
As is not uncommon in human experience, such situations present a complex of
motives and preferring one motive to another is in reality the far more delicate task,
reflected in part in decisions of this Court, of weighing the interests of employees in
concerted activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in a
particular manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by
the employer's conduct.
Id. at 228-29.
The test as so formulated in its entirety may have been applied by the Supreme Court in
a later case. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967). However, it appears
that the Court in dictum added a gloss derived from its decisions in NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S.
278 (1965) and American Ship Building Co. in formulating its analysis that gloss being an
intermediate step of determining whether the impact of the discriminatory conduct on the
employees is comparatively slight or inherently destructive. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. at
34. Only if the impact on the employees is comparatively slight, said the Court, must an
antiunion motivation be proved, and then only if the employer has come forward with evidence
of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct. Id. Moreover, the burden
was put on the employer to prove-the existence of legitimate business objectives "since proof of
motivation is most accessible to him." Id. (It is little wonder that so many articles have been
written on this subject!).
Another case that might be squeezed into this general analytical category is NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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"inherently" prejudicial,10 6 if the inference of unlawful intention is
compelling, the Board may be entitled to disbelieve any justification
proffered by the employer.10 It may also be the case, at least in
those cases involving economic disputes and requiring specific evidence of employer intent, that the burden now will be on the NLRB
General Counsel to prove unlawful motivation, and perhaps even to
supply the evidence necessary to sustain a finding of intent.1 0 8
106. The phrase "inherently" prejudicial is based on the Court's use of the word "inherently" in Radio Officers' Union noting that "[t]his recognition that specific proof of intent is
unneccessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership
is but an application of the common law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his conduct." 347 U.S. at 45; Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 228 (stating
that "[ihe outcome may well be the same when intent is founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself."); see also Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. 26, 34 (stating that "[f]irst, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was 'inherently destructive' of important employee rights, no proof of an
antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the
employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations.").
107. See supra note 106.
108. In addition to the difficulty of ascertaining the standard of proof appropriate to a
given case, there is some difficulty in determining where the burden of proof should rest for
different elements of the various standards. The National Labor Relations Act places the general burden of proving a violation of the unfair labor act provisions on the NLRB General
Counsel. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). However, that does not necessarily mean that the
General Counsel has the burden of proving or disproving everything that may have a bearing
on the outcome in the case. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
For a long while there was special difficulty in resolving the problem of burden of proof in
"mixed motive" employee discharge cases. In these cases, there would be evidence of employer
anti-union animus, but in addition, the employer would contend that a legitimate business
justification for the action was the overriding reason.
Appellate Courts had taken the position that the burden is on the General Counsel to
disprove the business justification asserted in those cases. The Board finally received Supreme
Court approval for its own approach to this problem, which was to allocate the burden of proof
between the General Counsel and the employer. See Wright Line Inc., 251 N.L.R.B., 1083
(1980), aff'd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). In Wright Line,
the Board placed the initial burden on the General Counsel to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by first proving that the employer showed anti-union animus. See id. The burden then shifted to the employer to overcome evidence of discrimination by establishing a
legitimate employer business justification. Id. If the employer failed in that burden, the decision would support the unfair labor practice. Id. If the employer succeeded in establishing a
business justification for the action, then the burden would shift back to the General Counsel
to either rebut the justification or to show by further evidence that it was pretextual. See also
TransporationManagement Corp., 462 U.S. 393.
This allocation of the burdens of proof has proved useful in ordinary cases involving discharge or discipline of employees in situations where there is evidence of employer hostility to
a labor organization, and the employee is identified as a member or supporter of the union.
See, e.g., TransportationManagement Corp., 462 U.S. 393; Wright Line Inc., 662 F.2d 899
(1981). However, it remains a test that requires proof of employer anti-union animus, and then
allows the employer to overcome the unfair labor charge by evidence of a legitimate business
reason for the action taken against the employee. Whether the Supreme Court will apply it in
cases involving economic disputes between unions and employers remains to be seen.
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These different standards for finding a violation of the Act are
problematic because value judgments are involved in making the

choice between the standards in different situations and the case's
outcome will depend in large part upon the test chosen. What should

that value judgment be? Should the balance be tipped toward the
employees or the employer? Who should decide that issue? The Su-

preme Court has stated unequivocally that such policy judgments
are for Congress, and not for the National Labor Relations Board. x"9
However, as Professor Summers has argued, it appears that Con-

gress has never made the policy judgments the Supreme Court finds
necessary."x 0 It seems fair to conclude, as Professor Summers has,
that the Supreme Court has itself made these judgments by overturning the Board and deciding on the appropriate test to be applied

in certain critical cases."'
Where employer actions have been taken to disadvantage union
or employee economic interests, and thus "indirectly" discourage
union membership, the Court has come down firmly on the side of
the employers." 2 This position has resulted. from the Court majority
view that the sole concern of the Act is to protect the employees'
organizational rights against employer actions." 3 In the opinion of
the Court, the National Labor Relations Act was never intended to
protect or advance the economic interests of employees in opposition
109.
110.

American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 315-18 (1965).
Summers, supra note 64, at 74.

111.

Id.at 72.

112. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. 300; NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965); see also Summers, supra note 64, at 73.
113. This is the Court's conclusion in American Ship Building Co. where the Court
discusses its perception of the policy of the Act and chides the Board for "functioning as an
arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of
their bargaining demands." 380 U.S. at 315-18 (originally stated in Labor Board v. Insurance
Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1960)). The Court stated:
The central purpose of these provisions was to protect employee self-organization
and the process of collective bargaining from disruptive interferences by employers.
Having protected employee organization in countervailance to the employers' bargaining power, and having established a system of collective bargaining whereby the
newly coequal adversaries might resolve their dispute, the Act also contemplated
resort to economic weapons should more peaceful methods not avail. Sections
8(a)(1) and (3) do not give the Board a general authority to assess the relative
economic power of the adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to
one party or the other because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power.
Id. at 317. The Court further complained that in finding the lockout a violation of section
8(a)(3) "the Board has stretched §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) far beyond their functions of protecting
the rights of employee organization and collective bargaining." Id.; see also NLRB v. Insurance Agents' In'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). It is worth noting that the 1947 and 1959
amendments did place limitations on certain union economic weapons. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§
151-168 (1982).
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to those of their employers. 14
In a very recent case under the Railway Labor Act, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, spoke of employee participation
in an economic strike as a "gamble" on the part of the employees
that they would have enough strength to win concessions from the
employer."" She concluded that the striking employees assumed the
risk of losing their domiciles and schedules, which had been acquired
as a result of job seniority, by so gambling."" The opinion suggests
that, short of destroying seniority in the bare-bones sense of ranking
the employees for purposes of layoff and recall,"17 employers are at
liberty to take away employee benefits achieved through seniority in
order to induce strikers to cross the picket line, even if that means
breaking the strike by destroying the striking employees' solidarity.
The fact that the right to strike is statutorily protected does not
mean that the economic rights of the employees have any statutory
protection." 8
114. American Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316-18.
115. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct. 1225,
1233 (1989).
116. Id. Senior flight attendants who remained out on strike while TWA proceeded to
hire permanent replacements (including strikers it induced to cross the picket line), lost their
seniority-related benefits of schedules and domiciles as a result of the employer's granting of
preferential choices to the permanent replacements. Id. Justice O'Connor's view was that if
such benefits were important to the strikers, they were always free to go back to work during
the strike. Id. There is no discussion in the opinion of the impact the loss of preferred schedules and domiciles would have on the striking employees. See id.
Many airline flight attendants today are married and have children. Many have substantial investments in homes. The loss of a preferred domicile could result in the breaking up of
families because of different domiciles of husband and wife, and could result in serious disruption of the education of their children. Surely these seniority-related rights should be ranked
with layoff and recall seniority as matters of fundamental importance to the employees involved, and their loss as "inherently destructive" of union activity.
117. This practice was held to be an unfair labor practice without proof of subjective
employer motivation because "inherently destructive" of employee rights under the National
Labor Relations Act, section 8(a)(3). See Erie Resistor v. NLRB, 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963).
The Erie Resistor case was discussed extensively in the Court's majority and dissenting opinion in Trans World Airlines, and was distinguished on its facts from that case. See 109 S. Ct.
1225 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It might prove significant to future decisions under the
NLRA that the Railway Labor Act has no provision comparable to section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA. Compare Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) with National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). It seems difficult to conclude from Justice
O'Connor's opinion, however, that she did not intend to give Erie Resistor a highly restricive
interpretation in the Trans World Airlines decision, thereby at least inviting employers covered by the NLRA to test the waters by taking similar drastic actions in future strike situations. See 109 S.Ct. 1225 (1989).
118. It is important to stress that the provisions of the Railway Labor Act differ from
those of the National Labor Relations Act, as the Court itself noted in the Trans World Airlines decision. See 109 S. Ct. 1225, 1233-4 (discussing these differences).
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Some commentators have argued that in a situation where such
a choice between employer and employee economic power must be
made, the proper neutral approach would be to balance the harm to
employees from the employer's actions against the legitimate needs
of the employer to take those actions.119 The Supreme Court appears
not to have used that balancing analysis. Instead, its approach deals
with the cases as being in or out of one of the analytical categories
previously discussed.12 0 The Court has kept for itself the final choice
as which category is appropriate. At least for the foreseeable future,
protection of employee economic interests through employee collective economic action appears not to be within the ambit of the Act,
as construed and applied by the Court.
This raises a troubling question: why would employees and unions want to go to the trouble of organizing for collective representation by a union when the effectiveness of their one economic weapon,
the strike, is going to be rendered utterly useless in the end? Surely
the employees do not need the Act or the huge administrative and
judicial apparatus that goes with it to protect their right to join a
membership organization just for the sake of joining it. A simple
statutory statement of rights of employees to join or support any
lawful organization would suffice for that purpose. Nor do employees
need the burden of the membership fees and dues charged by unions
for the mere privilege of belonging to such an organization. If the
only meaningful economic power in collective action is to be
whatever the "neutral" labor market may give the employees at any
particular time, it does not seem rational for anyone to bother to join
or support unions. Perhaps that is one reason that private sector
119.

See Summers, supra note 64, at 72-74. Summers argues that the Supreme Court

itself was balancing economic rights of union and employer in that case. See id. "Despite its
disarming formulations, what the Court is balancing is not legal rights but economic weap-

ons." Id. at 72 "In American Ship Bldg. Co. the Court is simply asserting that in its judgment
the employer should not be denied the strategic advantage of picking the time of battle;. .. "

Id. Certainly the Board had taken a balancing approach. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); see also Summers, supra note 64, at 72-74. As Summers said:

"[in arguing American Ship Bldg. Co. the Board candidly acknowledged that its decision was
based on its expert judgment that availability of the lockout 'would so substantially tip the
scales in the employer's favor as to defeat the Congressional purpose of placing employers on a
par with their adversaries at the bargainging table.'" Id. at 73. Summers concludes that the
Court merely substitutes its "balancing" for that of the Board. Id. He then states: that "[t]he
elaborate rationalizations of the Court are calculated to confuse everyone, including the Justices." Id.
120. It is true that the Court in American Ship Building Co. referred to the "balancing"
test it had earlier referred to in Erie Resistor, as a possible test, but it quickly excluded that as
a test applicable to the economic dispute context of American Ship Building Co., 380 U.S.
300, 312 (citing to Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 229).
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union membership in the United States is currently below fifteen
percent, which is the lowest level since the passage of the Wagner
Act.12 ' Furthermore, why should the American people continue to
pay for such an apparently meaningless system? Why encourage
union membership and the naturally resulting economic strife if it is
not going to achieve significantly improved working conditions for
the employees with which the employer is not already in accord?
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

A.

An Overview

The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, interpreted and
applied to a wide variety of cases, has not accomplished even the
basic goal of securing widespread collective representation of employees and collective bargaining between employers and employees.
Many factors might have a bearing on this, including the growing
ineffectiveness of unions due to loss of meaningful economic power.
Other probable factors are increasingly sophisticated and effective
employer resistance to unionization of their businesses,' 22 and employee disillusionment with some unions as institutions because of
poor management or corruption, or because of dislike of the authoritarian control some unions attempt to exercise over employee actions. 123 Statutory changes have made majority representation less
meaningful and have severely limited the unions' choice of economic
weapons. 24 Added to this list is one clear statutory policy, present
121.

The most recent available statistics are published in Current Wage Development,

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Feb. 1989. These figures show that 12.9

percent of all private nonagricultural wage and salary workers were members of unions in
1988 (a decline from 13.4 percent in 1987), while 14.2 percent were represented by unions. Id.
at table 2. According to figures supplied by Summers, in 1978 29.7 percent of employees in
this category were covered by collective bargaining agreements. Summers, supra note 52, at
15. That suggests that there has been a 13.5 percent drop in employee representation by unions in the private sector in just ten years. A far higher percentage of workers in the government sector (federal and state) were covered by collective agreements: 43.6 percent. Id. A
higher percentage - 36.7 percent - of public sector employees were members of unions. Id.
122. See Weiler, supra note 90.
123. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)).
124. Both the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-197 (1982)) and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982)), made extensive changes which affected majority
representation and union economic power. These changes included section 7 of the NLRA,
which permits employees to refrain from involvement in union actions, notwithstanding the
majority wishes of the other employees in their bargaining unit. See U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
These changes also outlawed the closed shop, and imposed numerous restrictions on employee
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from the time of the original Act, which requires that the employer
and the union to bargain over the terms of a possible collective bargaining agreement, but allows them ultimately not to agree on
anything.125
Decisions of the Supreme Court limiting union access to employees during organizing campaigns, and approving employers' use
of powerful economic weapons, such as the hiring of permanent
replacements for striking employees, the lockout, and retaliatory
plant closing, have undermined the effectiveness of unions by making
employee organization more difficult for unions, and have emasculated the usefulness of strikes as economic weapons.1 2 6
However, the Court decisions concerning the economic power
relations of the union and the employer, which have to come down
on one side or the other in each case, address the dilemma created
by the Act. Since the statute provides no policy guidance in deciding
those issues, the choice of sides is essentially a political one, which
the Court has chosen to exercise, rather than defer to the National
Labor Relations Board. 27 The Court decisions may have taken the
most prudent course available due to the lack of clear statutory policy direction. The decisions have left the power where it was in the
beginning, with the employers, subject only to the market power unions may occasionally have as a result of full employment or high
demand for certain products. 2 '
The final picture is one of futility in action - at great trouble
and expense to all the participants and to the public. It is this ultimate futility that has led many critics to argue with some cogency
that the interpretations given to the Act by the Board and the courts
have destroyed both its spirit and its purpose. 2 9
organizational and economic action through the provisions of section 8(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982)
125. NLRA section 8(a)(5), read together with NLRA section 8(c), imposes a duty to
bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of employment, but not a duty to agree to a
collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(c) (1982).
126. See generally Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in
Labor Law: Union Membership Resignations and Srikebreaking in the New Economy, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (1988); Atleson, supra note 72; Weiler, supra note 90; Note, Section
8(b)(1)(A) from Allis-Chalmers to Pattern Makers' League: A Case Study in Judicial Legislation, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1986) (authored by Kevin C. Marcoux).
127. Summers, supra note 70, at 87 (stating that "[th]e responsibility for weighing the

values and shaping the institutions of collective bargaining comes to rest upon the Court.").
128. This situation is increasingly less likely to develop today because of the growth of
foreign competition. As pointed out earlier, the importation of products into the United States
currently exceeds exports. See supra text and accompanying note 73.
129. See, e.g., Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding NLRB, 132 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 13 (Sept. 4, 1989) (concerning a meeting of the president of the AFL-CIO with
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Perhaps the presence of even an ineffectual law on the books is

better than no law at all, at least in some cases. It may, on the one
hand, tend to discourage excesses of power and create a more civil
atmosphere.' On the other hand, the lack of meaningful rights and
remedies can and does lead to abuses of power, and ultimately will
lead to a dangerous sense of frustration on the part of those who find
themselves on the losing side of the equation.' 3 In any event, such
meaningless laws ultimately make a mockery of the whole idea of
justice. They hide real problems behind a facade of official concern
and lead us as a nation to ignore the need for change. Therefore,
fundamental changes need to be made in America's labor law policy,
and in the means used to carry out a new policy.
First, recognition should be given to employee interests in the
work they do. These interests include, but are not limited to, the
conditions under which they work, the current and postponed rewards they receive for it, and security in their employment.' 2 These
interests should be transformed by new legislation into certain legal
reporters).
Kirkland said he prefers "the law of the jungle" over the current system because the law places too many restrictions on what unions can do to assist each
other. 'The law forces us, our unions, to work on products that are manufactured by
law-breaking employers, employers that are in violation of the law in fact and in
spirit... [It] forbids us to show solidarity and direct union support,' he declared.
But Kirkland said he would rather see a 'changed law' than the law of the
jungle. 'I think there ought to be a fair labor law in this country, and there ought to
be a code that is fair to both labor and management, and gives them both decent
respect and recognizes both as essential elements of the human community and that
collective bargaining has a positive value. ....
Id.
The end result is that the legal rules developed by the Board and the courts do not
express or implement the premises and purposes of the statute. Our labor law today
is not one which encourages the practices and procedures of collective bargaining; it
is at best one of declared indifference.
Id. at 17; see also Summers, supra note 52.
130. The assumption behind this statement is that some employers, at least, respect the
law and make efforts to abide by both its letter and its spirit.
131. Such frustration was apparent in the recent wild cat strikes in the coal mines of
West Virginia.
132. Security of employment includes more than protection against layoff and recall.
People put down roots in their communities and are not infinitely mobile. Moreover, people are
mortal, and cannot go on indefinitely learning new job skills and starting all over again, especially when the skills involved are complex and require years to perfect. Nor should people
have to lose whatever increased benefits they have gained through the accumulation of skills
and experience by starting all over again from the bottom of some other ladder. Security of
employment can take forms other than a lifetime property interest in a particiular job, however. It has a value, and one of the proposals discussed herein, is for legislation that will
protect peoples' monetary interests in their jobs in the event the work is terminated for legitimate reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 151-52.
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rights, most if not all of which could be protected or effectuated
through collectively bargained agreements as an alternative to statutory enforcement. 133 Of necessity, consideration of any such legislation will require confronting issues of employer power, and some currently held views on employer "property rights" as abstract legal
propositions.13
Second, serious examination should be made of the presently accepted role of unions as active parties in the employment relationship
where collective bargaining exists. At least some employer resistance
to collective bargaining is traceable to the current necessity of entering into a contract governing employee relations with non-employee
third party organizations that demand the loyalty of those
employees.' 35
One part of this examination should be devoted to the statutory
necessity for a successful union organizational campaign as a prerequisite to collective bargaining. 136 Perhaps the process could be simplified and made less adversarial.
As part of the same examination, the linkage between the representation and membership aspects of union relations with the employees they represent should be questioned. 3 The linkage has already been fractured by the 1947 Amendments to the Act, which
limit the aspects of union power an unwilling employee may be required to accept.' 38 It may well be that effective employee representation would benefit from a total separation of union membership
from the representation process. After all, the central issue in any
133. The legal rights created should establish a floor for any collectively bargained
rights, but not a ceiling, much as the Minimum Wage Act establishes a floor for wages. Cf.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). If the rights are further protected by the
collective bargaining agreement, some of them, at least, could be protected through the mechanism of a grievance and arbitration procedure as an alternative to the remedies provided by
statute.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 47-71; see also Summers, supra note 52, at 17
stating that:
Private claims for the primacy of 'property rights' and 'managememnt prerogatives'
have overriden the social claims for equality of bargaining power, providing industrial democracy, and guaranteeing individual justice. Employers, acting as self-appointed surrogates of individual rights, have misappropriated those rights for their
own benefit to defeat collective bargaining and deprive employees of individual
rights.
135. See generally, Abraham, supra note 126; 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr 1935, at 373-81 (1985) (providing the testimony of James
A. Emery for the National Association of Manufacturers, Hearings on S.2926).
136. See Weiler, supra, note 52.
137. See Abraham, supra note 126.
138. See amendments to sections 7, and 8(a)(3) Taft-Hartley amendments, Pub. L. No.
80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 140-41 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982)).
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labor policy will ultimately be the employees' relations with their
employers. Why should union membership per se, and all that membership in a fraternal organization entails, be at all relevant to the
question of whether employees use the services of a professional representative to bargain collectively with their employers?
The modern utility of the fraternal labor association as a principal contracting party in the collective bargaining relationship needs
to be thoroughly examined. 3 There may be more effective and less
costly ways of encouraging collective bargaining and of serving the
needs of employees in the collectively bargained employment relationship than the system we have become accustomed to. 140 In any
re-examination of policy, the needs of all employees for effective representation in negotiations and other relations with their employers
should be paramount to any concern for maintaining unions as they
are today simply because they have existed for a long time, and political power structures have been built on them.
Third, the wisdom and/or necessity of continuing a policy of
economic warfare between employers and employees should be questioned. There are better ways to resolve disputes, less costly to both
employers and employees, and less destructive to the employer-employee relationship, than to resort to strikes and lockouts. 4 '
B. Specific Proposalsfor a New Legislative Program
1. The legal rights of employees should be spelled out as part of
the policy statement of new legislation, and should include the
following:
139.

Historically, traditional unions have not been an unmixed blessing to employees.

They have frequently had exclusionary membership policies, and until 1964, with the passage

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), were under no duty to refrain
from discriminating in membership on grounds of race, sex, religion or national origin. See
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). There are large sections of the working
population that existing unions have failed to organize, which tends to offset the social value of

gains they have achieved for the employees in areas where they have successfully organized.
See Summers, Closing Address, 11 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 187 (1982-83).
140. The "system," of course, has changed over time, partly as a result of the elimina-

tion of the closed shop in 1947, and partly because of the amendment to section 8(a)(3) allowing only the "union" or "agency" shop to be included in a collective bargaining agreement,
which has been interpreted as meaning only the payment by an employee of reasonable dues
and initiation fees, and not full membership in a union. See supra note 24. The text is refer-

ring to our traditional concepts of unions as principals in the collective bargaining relationship
with employers, rather than as agents of the employers, and as such embodying somehow the

collective power of the employees. See 0.

KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW

70-72, §

165, 211-222 (1972).

141.

The proposal is for a procedure culminating, in the absence of an agreement at an

earlier point, in interest arbitration. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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a. All employees in the United States should be given the right
to protection against arbitrary or unfair dismissal from work.142 This
will require long-overdue abolition of the employment-at-will doctrine. 143 Such a right can be (and usually is today) adequately protected by collectively bargained agreements that require just cause

for dismissal or discipline of employees, and provide for a privately
structured grievance-arbitration procedure. 4'

For those employees who do not vote for collective bargaining,
statutory protections and procedures will be needed. These proce-

dures might be administered by the National Labor Relations Board
regional offices, which already have substantial background in certain types of unfair dismissals." 5 Perhaps administrative law judges
could hear these cases in the first instance, or even less formal tribunals could be created for the purpose of hearing these cases expedi-

tiously. The concept of unfair dismissal should be broadened by legislation to include any discharge resulting from discrimination on
142. Many states have already modified the employment-at-will doctrine and have provided certain protections for employees against unfair dismissal either through case law developments in tort and contract, or (in a few cases) by legislation. The National Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws recently proposed a tentative model state statute, the Employment
Termination Act, which would provide for arbitration of dismissal disputes instead of court
litigation. See "Pros and Cons of Wrongful-Discharge Legislation, National Labor Policy,
Are Weighed by ABA Panelists," 131 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 554 (Aug. 28, 1989); St. Antoine, Are Employees Acquiring a Property Interest In Their Jobs?-Some Implications of
Recent Developments in Unjust Dismissal, Plant Closings, and Employee Ownership, at 7-8,
Twenty-Second Annual Pacific Coast Labor Law Conference, Seattle, Washington (1989)
(unpublished). Professor St. Antoine reported that "more than a dozen" jurisdictions are considering legislation to give employees protection against dismissal without just cause. Id. at 7.
See generally, Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); M. ROTHSTEIN, A. KNAPP &
L. LIEBMAN, supra note 39, at 738-858. Professor Summer urged adoption of an unfair dismissal law several years ago. Summers, supra note 52, at 31-33.
The proposal here is for a national law protecting against unfair dismissal, which state
laws might supplement in those instances of employment the federal legislation cannot constitutionally reach (if there are any). The right to fair treatment in employment should be considered one of the fundamental rights of persons living in the United States.
143. See Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 36.
144. Grievance-arbitration procedures, differing in many particulars, are commonly included in collective bargaining agreements. Out of 500 major collective bargaining agreements
in the private sector surveyed by the Industrial Relations Center of Cleveland State University, 385 contained provisions for both grievance procedures and arbitration as the final stage
of grievance resolution. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTER, CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY,
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR PRIVATE SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AS OF

JANUARY 1, 1988, table 8.1 (1989). Another 114 contained grievance procedures alone, and I
contained an arbitration provision alone. See id.
145. The reference is to charges made by, or on behalf of, individual employees to the
National Labor Relations Board for dismissals in violation of either NLRA sections 8(a)(1) or
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grounds of race, sex, religion, age, nationality, or sexual preference.
In these cases employees should not have the burden of proving unlawful employer motive, but instead the burden should be on the employer to prove just cause. 146 In other cases of unfair dismissal, the
burden should be on the employer to prove, by a preponderance of
all of the evidence, that just cause existed for a dismissal.
Remedies should include back pay and reinstatement awards, 4"
and should be expanded to provide for incidental and consequential
damages and, in cases of outrageous unfairness, for punitive damages. 48 Permissible employer defenses should be enumerated in the
legislation in such a way as to encourage regularity of employment
practices and clear communication of work rules to employees. All
credibility questions should be left to the trier of fact, and should not
be subject to judicial review, as should any questions concerning the
relative weight to be given to evidence. In a situation where employees have rejected representation and collective bargaining, it would
seem fair that employees should bear the burden of paying for their
own legal representation in such proceedings, but provisions should
be made for recovery of attorney's fees by a successful plaintiff.
Serious consideration should be given to limiting judicial review
except for substantial constitutional questions. Perhaps a special appellate tribunal could be established for run of the mill cases, limited
to review of alleged errors of law. Great Britain's experience with its
Unfair Dismissal Act149 might provide insights into useful procedures and remedial approaches.
In those instances where employees choose collective bargaining,
the grievance and arbitration procedure should include the same
range of rights and remedies as the unfair dismissal statute. In cases
of race, sex, religion or national original discrimination, access to
146. The reason for this allocation of burden of proof to the employer is that the employer has the records, and the resources to produce them, whereas the employee who has been
discharged is in a disadvantageous position with respect to securing evidence of employer motive. Indeed, it might be prudent to include in such legislation some form of official investigative assistance to employees who allege unjust discharge, to help them to acquire the facts they

need to defend against the allegations the employer may make in justification of the dismissal.
147.

Back pay and orders of reinstatement are commonly ordered by the National Labor

Relations Board as remedies for violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) that have resulted in
employee discharge.
148. Back pay awards, especially if legal fees must be deducted from them, are not
adequate to compensate the unfairly dismissed employee for the losses incurred. These losses
might include the loss of property resulting from the inability to find replacement work, the
costs of job seeking, and the like. The suggestion of punitive damages is intended to provide a
really meaningful deterrent to arbitrary or malicious treatment of employees by employers.

149. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 5, §§ 54-77 (U.K.).
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procedures and remedies under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act 150 should be an available alternative to collective bargaining procedures and remedies.
b. Protection against the financial ravages of permanent layoffs
because of lack of work or cessation of work done by the employees
should be provided. The need for such protection increases the longer
an employee works for a particular employer or, for reasons of age,
becomes less able to find comparable employment elsewhere. To the
extent employees contribute directly, through payroll deductions, to
a layoff protection fund, their contributions should be considered
vested and go to them at retirement with accrued interest, if they are
not used sooner. Alternate plans, requiring contributions to a centrally administered fund by employers and the government, might be
considered preferable. However, the risk of loss of employment for
economic reasons should be shared in at least some circumstances by
both employers and employees and not borne entirely by the government. It will be difficult to differentiate the circumstances leading to
permanent layoffs, but that will need to be done in order to establish
a sound piece of legislation.
In recent years there have been instances where decisions were
made to shut down industries because it was more profitable to invest in other sectors than to take the necessary steps to make the
closed industries competitive and profitable. 151 Further, some industries have relocated or subcontracted to save labor costs. 1' 2 In circumstances like that, it would seem fair that more of the cost of
layoffs should be borne by the employer than either the employees or
the government.
Regardless of the particulars of the legislation, its policy should
state clearly that using the labor of others to make a profit is a privilege, not a right, and that this privelege imposes a duty on the em150. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq.). This would continue the present practice. Under Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), an employee entitled to bring an action pursuant to the 1964
Civil Rights Act was held entitled to do so even after an arbitration proceeding raising the
same issues.
151. See Atleson, supra note 72.
152. Under NLRA section 8(a)(5), there is a duty to bargain about the decision to close
or subcontract where the decision is made solely to reduce labor costs, but there is only a duty
to bargain about the effects of the decision if the decision is based on other business reasons.
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). However, even in those
infrequent instances where the duty to bargain about the decision is imposed, there is no duty
for the employer to agree with the union's objections to the employer's decision to make the

change. See id.
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ployers to behave in a socially and financially responsible manner
toward those employees, their dependents, and their communities.

Whatever the legislative scheme chosen, its main purpose should be
to prevent at least some of the sudden catastrophic losses employees

(and in many cases entire communities) have suffered as a result of
losing long-term employment from plant shutdowns or relocations.
c. All employees in businesses with ten or more employees
should have a nonwaivable right to vote every three years' 53 on: (1)
whether or not they would like to have representation to engage in
collective bargaining with their employers and (2) if so, what organization should be the representative working on their behalf. Collective bargaining does require that some person or persons represent
the group; 154 the employer obviously cannot be expected to bargain
with a town meeting. The legislation should insist on professionally
qualified, independent representation, rather than employee committees, in order to avoid any problems of employer domination or control,'155 and to provide at least a minimal assurance of competence on
the part of the representative.
153. Three years is an entirely arbitrary period. On average, it seemed about the right
time in order to avoid constant workplace interruptions, keep costs down, allow a reasonable
period for a collective bargaining agreement to be in place, and yet still allow employees reasonably frequent opportunities to consider again the question of whether to be represented, and
if so, by what organization. It is possible that a shorter period of time, say one year, should be
stipulated in those situations where the employees have never been represented, and choose at
the first election not to collectively bargain. The policy of encouraging collective bargaining
relationships to develop, might be better served by a shorter period in those circumstances. In
the private sector, it appears that collectively bargained agreements have an average duration

of 25 months to 3 years. See

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTER, CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY,
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR PRIVATE SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AS OF

1, 1988, table 1.4 (1989). Where a decision is made to enter into a collective bargaining relationship, sufficient time must be allowed for the agreement to be negotiated, and
also for the employees to fully evaluate their elected representative. Under present law, there is
a flexible three-year contract bar rule, to which there are numerous exceptions. See A. Cox, D.
BOK & R. GORMAN supra note 39, at 272-76. For an example of an exception, see American
Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953).
154. The degree to which the employees must identify with the group represented is an
interesting question. See Abraham, supra note 126, at 1284-85, stating that:
Those who choose to act with others, be it in furtherance of a shared goal or identity
or only to advance the likelihood of obtaining their private wishes, must seek more
than exchange. They must assess the situation, organize and inform themselves, formulate a collective goal, and then act strategically, employing selective incentives as
well as collective discipline to obtain that goal.
See also id. at 1286-93; 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 140, at 70-73.
155. Employer domination or control over unions is prohibited by NLRA section
8(a)(2). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). The practice of establishing company-dominated unions was one of the principal evils at which the Wagner Act was aimed, as is clear from the
legislative history.
JANUARY
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The employees' periodic right to vote would carry with it the
duty of all employees to be bound by the decision of the majority of
1 6
employees in the bargaining unit for the next three years. ' Of
course individuals can disagree with decisions taken by a majority in
a democratic society. However, this does not mean, and should not
mean in new legislation, that dissidents can sabotage the interests of
the majority.
In small companies, elections could be conducted by impartial
third parties or by businesses that rent voting machines and provide
vote-counting services. 57 In the case of large employers, the NLRB
regional offices could continue to provide those services. A ballot
might be limited to a "yes" or "no" vote on the question of collective
bargaining, or it might also include a preferential ballot for a representative (assuming more than one representative is available).
No union or other potential representative would have to seek
authorization cards from employees to appear on a ballot, but would
only have to request inclusion.' 58 The employer could be given a
choice of either providing potential representatives access to the
premises to meet and/or distribute literature to employees during
non-working times in non-working areas, or of providing such organizations a complete list of names and addresses of current employees sixty days before a scheduled election in order to give them time
to contact all the employees. Notice of scheduled elections could also
be published in newspapers along with other legal notices, at least
sixty days in advance.
No potential representative could condition representation on
employee membership in its organization. All employees in the election unit would have the same rights of access to the representative,
and to sit in on any scheduled discussions of bargaining issues or
negotiations in progress. On all issues requiring a vote, all employees
would be entitled to vote, and the majority decision would be binding
on all.
Potential representatives would be expected to describe fully the
representation services they would offer to employees before the elec156. The sole basis of such a requirement would be the democratic principal that all are
bound by a decision taken by the majority. This principal has been undermined by the decision

of the Supreme Court in Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
157. Such a business exists in Cleveland, Ohio. In places that do not provide commercial
voting machines or voting booth rentals, perhaps the local election board could be persuaded to
make its equipment available, as long as there is no conflict with general elections, otherwise,
there would have to be some provision in the legislation for the NLRB or other federal agency
to provide the equipment.
158. See Weiler, supra note 52.
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tion, and the monthly fees that would be assessed to all employees
for those services. If selected, a representative would have to consult
with the employees to establish collective bargaining priorities, and
would have to submit the contents of tentative agreements to all of
the employees for majority approval before entering into an agreement on behalf of the employees. The representative would be solely
an agent of the unit of employees, and would not be a party to the
contract with the employer. The representative would be a fiduciary,
and could have no conflicts of interest in its dealings with a particular group of employees.
Of course representatives should offer services other than professional advice on bargaining strategy and the actual negotiation of
contracts. These probably should include qualified financial analysis
of the employer's financial condition and competitive economic position, representation of employees at grievance and arbitration procedures, representation of the employees in dealing with the employer
on any contract changes during the three year period, and the like.15
The role of representatives would not differ greatly from the expert
functions now performed by unions in collective bargaining relations. 160 The relationship between unions and employees would be
simplified and clarified, and yet the relationship between employees
and employer would not be distorted by the presence of a non-employee third party.
Labor unions perform other functions that might be difficult
under this scheme, such as political lobbying. 1 ' There is no reason
for unions to discontinue their political operations, however. All that
would be required is a separation of the representation business from
union membership.
159.

In view of the high cost greivance arbitration, one item that should be considered in

connection with the legislation is the provision of group legal services insurance.
160. The only thing that would change is the relation between the union and the employees, and the relation between the employees and the employer. The development of new

collective bargaining representatives that would occur as a result of such legislation could,
however, create significant competition for existing unions. One level of that competition would
be the nature, amount, and quality of services provided to employee groups.
161. Unions, especially at the national level, have been and still are, actively engaged in

the ongoing process of recommending, supporting or opposing new legislation or legislative
reforms. Unions also employ expert staffs for this purpose. Union dues of members and nonmember represented employees pay for those services now. Under this scheme, political activities would be separated from the representation of employees, unless the employees voted spe-

cifically to authorize such activities in their name and on their behalf. Those activities include
the presentation of petitions or resolutions to Congress or the state legislatures, among others.
The point is that the employees which are represented pay for that representation, and should
be allowed to retain fairly direct and tight control over the use of their representation funds.
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If unions wanted to offer membership in separately funded organizations for political lobbying support, or for a host of other functions a membership organization might want to perform, such as the
provision of life, accident, and disability insurance, health clubs,
travel tours, newsletters and so on, there should be no objection to
that. In fact, the availability of a range of adjunct services might
make an organization more attractive as collective bargaining representative to the majority of employees. Models for such an approach
to the provision of extra services to members exist. For example, the
American Bar Association, American Association of University
Professors and American Association of Retired Persons, are but a
few of these models. 62 This proposal would by no means ring the
death knell for American labor unions. Indeed, if they put some energy into the process, they could end up representing millions of additional employees.
Professor Atleson' 63 raises more substantial questions concerning representational issues that should also be addressed by legislation. As he points out, there are serious disparities in bargaining relationships today because unions are not permitted to engage in joint
bargaining, even with very large, conglomerate or multinational corporation employers. 6 Bargaining is limited to employees in a particular bargaining unit. 6 5 New legislation should make joint bargaining on issues of common concern lawful in the case of such large
employers, where there might be several units of employees for election purposes; it should also make possible joint bargaining across
corporate lines in the case of conglomerates, and across international
lines in the case of multinational corporations. Representatives and
employees should also be able to communicate freely with others in
their own and related industries. A possible way to make this easier,
both for employees and their employers, is to require that in any
business, counting a conglomerate or multinational company as a
single business for this purpose, all election dates and all contract
dates will occur on the same day of the same year.
A right to vote every three years on the questions of collective
162. All of these organizations provide various sorts of insurance plans (through commercial companies) to their members. AARP has its own travel club. The ABA offers discounts on rental cars through Hertz. The AAUP offers a lower than average interest rate
credit card through a bank. The list could go on and on and all of these extra services are paid
for separately by the members who want them.
163. Atleson, supra note 72.

164.

Atleson, supra note 72; see also, THE

CONFERENCE BOARD, THE MULTINATIONAL

UNION CHALLENGES THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY

165.

(1975).

See Atleson, supra note 72, at 845-852.
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bargaining and representation will give employees a chance to reconsider current arrangements. It will make needed changes in representation easier than they now are, and it will give those who voted

against collective bargaining a chance to change their minds if their
decisions proved unwise.

The role of employers in this voting process should be defined.
Once the employees have been given a statutory right to vote every

three years, it is difficult to see how the employer has any legitimate
need to be involved in the decisions the employees make. 16 6 If the
relationship between employer and employees is a close one and if
individual bargaining has gone on successfully in the past, it is unlikely that the employees will suddenly decide to bargain collectively.
In large establishments, however, not much individual bargaining
goes on between employers and the bulk of their employees. 1 In a
non-union plant, the employees are paid what the employer is willing
to pay them. 68 Here there are strong reasons for not allowing the
employer to participate in any way in a representation election.
Since the new law would give all employees a statutory right to representation, and a statutory right to vote on the question of represen-

tation and collective bargaining every three years, employers would
have no good reason for trying to influence the outcome. 6

9

Any at-

166. See generally id. (discussing the impact of the employer's control of communication and permissible range of political discourse).
167. There are certain exceptions to this, and the university faculty model might be one
such exception. In some universities, budgeting is decentralized to a certain extent, to allow
deans or department chairs the power to allocate the amount of money they are allotted for
salaries as they see fit. In such a case, individuals might attempt to bargain about their salaries
with the person in authority. Even there, however, the person with the decision-making authority must be concerned about the impact of decisions on other employees. In a large factory
situation, where a hundred or more employees might perform essentially similar work, attempting to bargain individually with all those employees must seem like a senseless exercise.
There are easier ways to reward productivity, for example, with incentive plans or by the
institution of piece-work rates.
168! In a sense this is also true in a union plant, because the employer is under no
obligation to agree to anything the employer does not want.
169. This is not to say they might not have selfish reasons for wanting the employees not
to be represented or to engage in collective bargaining with the employees. However, if the
policy of the legislation is made crystal clear that the right to bargain collectively is a right the
employees possess under the statute, and the exercise of that right is solely the concern of the
employees, then any employer interference designed to influence the outcome of that decision
making would be inappropriate.
However, this does not reflect the law as it has been developed under the NLRA, which
has allowed substantial employer influence over employees in the name of free speech, and
under the protection of section 8(c) of the Act. In short, the new law should make it clear that
if employees want to bargain collectively with the employer for any reason, the employer must
simply agree to collectively bargain with their representative, without attempting to influence
the employees either to vote against collective bargaining, or in their choice of representative.
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tempt to interfere should be regarded as an attempt to defeat collective representation for reasons apart from the employees' interests in

acting collectively. Employers will have ample opportunity to state
their positions on the substantive issues affecting employment during

the collective bargaining process- itself.
New legislation should make clear, as the NLRA failed to do,
that any employer interference or influence at the voting stage is a

violation of the Act. 7 ° Such an approach would eliminate from our
future jurisprudence the greatest number by far of employer unfair
labor practices that come before the Board today. 171
The question of appropriate employee units remains. Some of
the current rules, such as exclusion of plant guards from a general
employee unit, 17 2 a separate vote for professional employees to determine whether they want to be included in a larger employee unit, 7 '

and exclusion of managerial and supervisory employees from a
unit, 174 might helpfully be continued. Perhaps simpler rules could be
worked out for the rest of the employee unit issues, beside those
under the current Act, to eliminate the necessity for some of the

individualized determinations that must be made by the Board
now.

1 75

Recognizing the legitimacy of joint bargaining among units of a
single employer or conglomerate or multinational corporation would
reduce the stakes involved in fighting over unit determinations. First,
employers and employees should be able to agree on unit determinations, as at present. Then there could be a general rule that in com-

panies with fewer than one hundred employees there could not be
more than one unit without the employer's consent. In larger compaSee generally Weiler, supra note 52.
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(c) (1982). Employer interference, restraint or coercion of employees is an unfair labor practice under the current Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1982). However, if an employer limits his actions to communications, written or oral, and
does not make threats of reprisals or force, or promise of benefits, such communications are
shielded by section 8(c) of the Act from being unfair labor practices or evidence of unfair
labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982). This proposal would extend protection far beyond
the present limits of NLRA section 8(a)(1). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
171. The largest number of cases filed with the NLRB, 53.1 percent, involved charges of
violation of section 8(a)(3) in fiscal year 1984. See 49 NLRB ANN. REP. 93 (1984) table 2.
Numerous charges of independent violations of section 8(a)(1), 15.4 percent, were also filed.
Section 8(a)(l) charges were actually filed in 100 percent of the cases, but the lower figure
represents those that charged actual violations of the section. Id. Both of these sections are
heavily implicated in organizational activities. See generally Weiler, supra note 52.
172. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1982).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1982).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
175. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966).
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riies the National Labor Relations Board regional offices might continue to make unit determinations as they do now, without judicial
review.'" 6 Companies with existing collective bargaining relations
could be left with their present unit structure, unless the employer or
employees requested that a new determination be made. If the employees in an existing unit structure opposed the change on grounds
that enlargement or splitting up might result in defeating collective
bargaining, then the existing unit structure should remain
untouched.
The reason for favoring the employees' choice in this matter is
simple: the two aims of this part of the new legislation should be
first, to encourage collective bargaining as much as possible in order
to empower employees in their economic and political relations with
their employers. This was the primary aim of the Wagner Act in
1935, although the economic power aspect of the legislation appears
to have been lost and forgotten since. 1" The second aim should be to
reduce industrial conflict, and to take the sting out of it when it does
occur. This legislation, taken in its totality, would do that by encouraging private, internal dispute resolution mechanisms through collective bargaining whenever possible, without taking the ultimate power
of choice to bargain collectively away from the majority of
employees.
d. Strikes and lockouts should be abolished. This is the last necessary step of any new legislation. The attempt to have the government establish ground rules effectively and fairly governing the con176. Under the present law, bargaining unit determinations made by the Board are only
reviewable by the various Courts of Appeals and only if one of the parties refuses to bargain
and is charged with an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5). See NLRB v. Chicago
Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
The reason for limiting or eliminating judicial review of such decisions altogether is to prevent

delays in the bargaining process. Perhaps it would be preferable to set out more rules for
bargaining unit determinations in new legislation rather than leaving the matter entirely to the
Board's discretion.

177. Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act as finally adopted and signed into
law, entitled "Findings and Policy," stated in part:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by

workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 Stat. 449, (Final Print 1935) reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1935, at 3270 (1985) (emphasis
added).
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duct of economic disputes that cannot be resolved through voluntary
collective bargaining has failed. Either one party or the other is go-

ing to win in that kind of economic warfare, and the evolution of the
case law has now assured that, except in a rare case, the employer
determined not to settle voluntarily is destined to be the winner. Al-

ternative methods of economic dispute resolution, starting with
mandatory mediation 1 8 at the first sign of pending impasse, should

be legislated. If mandatory mediation fails, then mandatory interest
arbitration17 9 conducted by a neutral, but well-informed third party,

with legislative power to decide any remaining issues in the failed
collective bargaining negotiations, could step in. In this legislation,
both the employer and the employees would "gamble" on the outcome of their failure to reach agreement on the terms of a collective
bargaining contract, not just the employees.
Mandatory interest arbitration would provide both employees
and employers with the greatest possible incentive to compromise in

order to reach a voluntary agreement, because neither side would be
able to predict in advance how an interest arbitrator might decide
the outstanding issues. Guidelines should be developed for interest
arbitrators to make certain that they will give sufficient consideration to the employer's circumstances, the economic position of the
178. Mandatory mediation before final impasse could facilitate agreement by allowing a
neutral party to help the collective bargaining representatives see possible areas of compromise. A possible further intermediary step might be advisory "fact finding," in which the neutral recommends to the parties a possible basis for settlement of their differences. A variety of
mechanisms are in use both in the United States and in other nations to help the parties settle
economic disputes. See The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes, An Eight
Nation Study by the National Academy of Arbitrators' Overseas Correspondents, 10 CONMP.
LAB. L.J. 271 (Spring 1989) (providing a helpful review of some procedures); see also 0.
KAHN-FREUND, supra note 140, at 111-23. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 3-4 (4th Ed. 1985).
179. "Interest" arbitration is to be distinguished from "grievance" or "rights" arbitration under an existing contract. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 178, at 98-101.
Interest arbitration is mandated in some other nations, including Australia and New Zealand.
See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 140, at 113-116. Interest arbitration is also extensively
resorted to in public sector collective bargaining in the United States. See generally F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 178, at 98-109, 803-51; U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, UNDERSTANDING FACT FINDING AND ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

(1980); Craver, Public

Sector Impasse Resolution Procedures, 60 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 779 (1984); DiLauro, Interest
Arbitration: The Best Alternative for Resolving Public-Sector Impasses, 14 EMPLOYEE REL
L.J. 549 (1989); Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 CHI[-]KENT L. REV.
815 (1984); Laner & Manning, Interest Arbitration: A New Terminal Impasse Resolution
Procedurefor Illinois Public Sector Employees, 60 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 839 (1984). Arvid
Anderson, former president of the National Academy of Arbitrators, has recently urged that
interest arbitration be adopted in the private sector, based on its successful use in the public
sector. See Anderson & Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (1987).
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employees relative to other employees in the company, the industry
and the region, and to the reasonableness of the positions taken by
each party on the remaining issues. The interest arbitrator should
not be bound to accept the position of one side or the other, but
should have the power to compromise the outstanding issues, as long
as the result reached is feasible and appears to the arbitrator to be
the fairest result possible in all the circumstances. It might be possible to specify that where there is a range of disagreement between
the parties, say as to salaries, the arbitrator's decision would have to
fall somewhere within the range, neither lower than the bottom nor
higher than the top. This might lead the parties initially to exaggerate their demands, but there would be an obvious risk to both sides
in doing that. The decision of an interest arbitrator should not be
reviewable, in the interest of allowing the parties to end their controversies as soon as possible, as well as to keep costs to a minimum.180
However, the decision of an interest arbitrator could be limited
to a period of one year, instead of the three year duration of a voluntarily reached collective bargaining agreement, thus giving the parties another opportunity to negotiate a more agreeable settlement at
the end of that time. If they continued to disagree, the interest arbitrator's decision could be allowed to stand for the remainder of the
three year period. Any decision made by an arbitrator should be retroactive to the date scheduled for completion of negotiations and the
signing of a new contract.
Certain terms should be required in every collective bargaining
agreement, and should be implied by law if they are not expressly
included. Chief among these is an impartial grievance-arbitration
procedure18 for dispute resolution that should be broadened in scope
to take the place of a statutory unfair dismissal law (except in cases
180. Statutory standards and procedures to guide interest arbitrators in their fact finding and decision-making would have to be adopted for the system to work fairly, and in the
event those procedures were not followed or the standards were not utilized by the interest
arbitrator, limited judicial review should be available in the interest of protecting the parties
rights to procedural due process. However, judicial disagreement with an interest arbitrator's
substantive award should not be grounds for judicial review.
181. Grievance arbitration is arbitration of rights disputes under an existing collective

bargaining agreement. See supra note 144. It is commonly provided for in collective bargaining agreements in the United States, but is not universal. See INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTER,
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR PRIVATE SECTOR COLECTIVE

1988, table 8.1 (1989). One reason for mandating this provision is to reduce the costs of dispute resolution to the public. Another is to expedite dispute resolution to the extent possible. The state of and costs of private grievance arbitration today should be thoroughly investigated prior to legislation to see whether the system
currently in place can be streamlined and made less expensive to the disputants.
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AS OF JANUARY 1,
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involving race, sex, religion, age or national origin discrimination).1 82
Another term that should be implied is one protecting the employees'
freedom to associate with others both on and off the job as long as
the association is lawful. Another is a provision prohibiting strikes by
employees or employer lockouts of employees. Another is a clause
granting all members of the unit the right to participate in and vote
on all issues relating to representation, and imposing on all members
an obligation to contribute an equal share of the cost of
representation.' 8 3
The bargaining relationship, to accomplish its purposes for both
employers and employees, cannot be allowed to degenerate into an
adversarial relationship. A successful employment relationship is one
based on cooperation, not competition, and certainly not warfare. A
national labor law based on respect for the rights and interests of all
participants in the employment relationship, including those who
perform the necessary work, will be far more successful in the long
run than the one we have now, which fails to deal either realistically
or fairly with the economic interests of employees. This proposal
points more accurately toward industrial peace and economic well
being than the National Labor Relations Act does because it advocates: establishing planned funds for cushioning employees against
the financial shock of displacement or early termination of employment; granting all employees the legal right to vote on issues of representation and restricting the employer's power to resist or sabotage
that right; providing a method for resolving economic disputes with182. This provision would give employees a choice of using either existing statutory remedies or resorting to arbitration, either as a final alternative, or as a nonbinding alternative.

183. This is a major change from the present law. Although a union may be legally
required to represent all the members of the bargaining unit, it does not have to seek their
approval before taking action. On the other hand, some unions permit their members to vote
on proposed contracts prior to agreement on their terms. With respect to contributing to the
costs of representation, this is possible today if a union can persuade an employer to agree to a

union shop clause as contemplated by the proviso to section 8(a)(3). Then all the employees in
the unit must "join" the union (in the minimal sense of paying reasonable membership fees

and dues to the union). The union may also succeed in persuading the employer to deduct
union dues payments from the employees wages, which provides some guarantee to the union

that it will receive the money promptly and without hassle. Both of these provisions at present
are subject to the agreement of the employer. A statute which seriously intends to foster collective bargaining among employees must recognize that the employees who benefit from it

(whether or not they voted for it) are responsible for bearing a fair share of its costs, just as
they must pay their fair share of taxes to the various governments, whether they like it or not,

in order to support their public institutions. Since employees will have frequent opportunities
to reconsider their choice of bargaining representative, the mandatory payments should not

become a basis for political oppression. The system of frequent elections should foster competition in the provision of representation services, in terms of quality, scope and costs.
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out industrial warfare; and recognizing employee rights to be free of
arbitrary and unjust action affecting their employment status.
e. Congress should create a permanent legislative oversight commission to monitor the application of national labor legislation, and
to report periodically on developments that do or may require legislative changes. Such a commission could help to keep Congress
abreast of major problems in application of the legislation or misunderstandings of its underlying policies. A commission might help
Congress draft legislative changes that need to be made because of
developing technology or shifts in patterns of employment. Members
of the commission should be well-informed of employer and employee interests, but should be non-partisan in their outlook. It would
not serve any useful purpose for Congress if such a commission became a platform for special interest groups.
V.

CONCLUSION

The proposals offered here for new legislation are based on a
frank conclusion that the National Labor Relations Act is not serving its original purpose of enlarging the power of employees to deal

with their employers and hence improve their living conditions.
There will be some disagreement with the conclusion, and many
more disagreements about the proposals. Hopefully, the debate will
no longer be principally confined to the pages of law journals, but

will draw needed attention from the legislators on whom responsibility for this country's currently disheveled and unsatisfactory labor

policies rests.
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